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Arthur Hellman
Abstract
In November 2005, four prominent legal organizations sponsored the second Na-
tional Conference on Appellate Justice. One purpose was to take a fresh look
at the operation of appellate courts 30 years after the first National Conference.
As part of the 2005 Conference, small groups of judges and lawyers gathered in
breakout sessions to discuss specific issues about the operation of the appellate
system. This article summarizes and synthesizes the participants’ comments. The
article is organized around three major topics, each of which builds on a different
contrast with the 1975 conference.
First, the participants in the earlier conference apparently assumed that appel-
late courts carry out their work in isolation from the political and social conflicts
of their time. No one today would accept that picture, but has immersion in con-
troversy changed the way appellate courts carry out their business? That is a
different, and more difficult, question.
Second, the 1975 conference took place at a time of ferment over issues involving
precedent, uniformity, and appellate structure. Today, concern about disunifor-
mity in appellate decisions barely registers on the seismometer of legal discourse.
This is particularly remarkable at the federal level, given that the only tribunal
with authority to resolve conflicts with nationally binding effect—the Supreme
Court of the United States—has actually reduced its decisional output to half of
what it was in 1975. Is this a problem? And what about uniformity in state sys-
tems?
Finally, issues of volume, process, and delegation of responsibility aroused great
concern among prominent judges, lawyers, and academics in the 1970s. Today,
there is little outcry today over the appellate shortcuts that once aroused so much
dismay. Is this because people were overreacting to the phenomenon of rapid
growth? Or has the quality of appellate justice deteriorated through incremental
steps that have gone unnoticed?
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THE VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES: A REPORT ON THE 
BREAKOUT SESSIONS AT THE 2005 NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON APPELLATE JUSTICE 
Arthur D. Hellman* 
“The past is a foreign country; they do things differently 
there.”1 Certainly judges and lawyers did many things 
differently in 1975, the year of the first National Conference on 
Appellate Justice. They carried out legal research by poring over 
digests and reporters, not by scrolling down a screen and 
following a hyperlink. They dictated briefs and opinions for 
their secretaries to type rather than drafting their work on 
personal computers. They communicated by letter and 
telephone, not email. They waited days or even weeks before 
they could read a new Supreme Court decision. And when 
attending a conference, they had to stand in line at a pay phone 
to call their offices. 
The political and societal setting was also different. 
Richard Nixon had recently resigned as President in the wake of 
the Watergate scandals. With the signing of the Helsinki 
accords, Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe seemed more firmly entrenched than ever. Only fifteen 
percent of the newly graduated law students were women. CNN 
and Fox News did not exist, and talk radio was in its infancy. 
One thing that has not changed since 1975 is the function 
of appellate courts. Today, as in the past, that function is 
twofold: to correct error or unfairness in the work of subordinate 
 
* Sally Ann Semenko Endowed Chair and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law. The author expresses his appreciation to Arthur England and Stephen L. 
Wasby for comments on earlier drafts of this Report and to Kevin C. Meacham, University 
of Pittsburgh School of Law Class of 2008, for research assistance. For additional ac-
knowledgments, see infra notes 3 and 10. 
 1. L.P. Hartley, The Go-Between 3 (Stein and Day 1967) (originally published 1953). 
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tribunals and to publish opinions that will serve as precedents 
for the decision of future cases. 
How have the changes in technology, society, and politics 
affected the way in which appellate courts carry out the tasks of 
review for error and lawmaking? That is one of the questions 
that led four prominent legal organizations to sponsor the 2005 
National Conference on Appellate Justice.2 An important part of 
the Conference was the breakout sessions in which small groups 
of judges and lawyers discussed specific issues about the 
operation of the appellate system. Each group had a discussion 
leader—a distinguished judge or an experienced appellate 
lawyer—who was primed to pose questions to the participants to 
elicit their own perceptions. Each group also had a Reporter—a 
prominent academic—who was prepared to report the 
responses.3 The reports were submitted (some with remarkable 
promptness!), and they fill a very large three-ring binder. In this 
Conference Report, I present a summary and synthesis of the 
main points that emerged from the discussions.4 To set the stage, 
I will say a few words about the planning and organization of 
the 2005 Conference, with emphasis on what might be called (in 
Hollywood fashion) the 1975 prequel. 
I. A TALE OF TWO CONFERENCES 
The first National Conference on Appellate Justice was 
organized by a group called the Advisory Council for Appellate 
Justice. The Advisory Council was an ad hoc group composed 
of some of the most eminent figures on the appellate scene. 
Most of its members were lawyers and judges (state and 
federal), not academics. What prompted the 1975 Conference 
was a widely held belief that the nation’s appellate courts—and 
 
 2. For a more detailed account of the planning and organization of the 2005 Confer-
ence, see Arthur J. England, Jr., Planning and Conduct of the National Conference, 8 J. 
App. Prac. & Process 65 (2006). 
 3. I take this opportunity to express my deep thanks to the discussion leaders and the 
Reporters for their dedicated efforts that made this Conference Report possible. The thor-
ough and thoughtful work of the Reporters is reflected on every page of the Report. A 
complete list of the discussion leaders and the Reporters will be found in the Appendix. 
 4. The depth and breadth of the discussions in the thirteen groups were truly impres-
sive. To keep this Report within reasonable length, many interesting topics and insightful 
comments had to be left on the cutting-room floor. 
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particularly the federal appellate courts—had reached a state of 
crisis. 
There is ample evidence of this perception. The leading 
academic study at that time, published in 1974 and distributed to 
participants in the 1975 Conference for background reading, had 
the title Appellate Courts: Staff and Process in the Crisis of 
Volume. The author was Professor Daniel J. Meador, already 
one of the foremost scholars of appellate systems. The foreword 
was written by Justice Louis Burke, a member of the California 
Supreme Court and president of the National Center for State 
Courts. Justice Burke referred to “the present serious crisis in 
this country’s appellate courts.”5 
As other Conference materials make clear, this assessment 
actually rested on two complementary concerns. One is captured 
by the title of Professor Meador’s book: the crisis was a crisis of 
volume, and the concern centered on the effect of volume on the 
process of deciding appeals. The Conference preview 
summarized this theme in its opening pages: 
The situation which calls for a National Conference on 
Appellate Justice is the staggering inflation in caseload 
which besets the appellate courts in the United States. . . . 
Spreading the efforts of a limited number of judges over a 
growing number of cases will threaten the quality of the 
process by making the work of the judges less open and 
visible, and hence less subject to account, or by increasing 
a tendency toward delegation of more aspects of judicial 
work and toward an appellate process that is less humane 
and more bureaucratic in character.6 
But there was a second theme as well: The surge in the 
volume of appeals posed a threat not only to the quality of the 
process, but also to the value of uniformity—the “harmonious 
and uniform administration of the law.”7 The concern embraced 
state as well as federal courts. As early as 1965, Professor 
Geoffrey Hazard expressed the fear that further expansion of the 
California appellate system would convert “once authoritative 
 
 5. Louis Burke, Foreword, in Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Courts: Staff and Process 
in the Crisis of Volume vii (West Pub. Co. 1974). 
 6. Advisory Council for Appellate Justice, Appellate Justice 1975: Materials for a 
National Conference vol. I (Summary and Background) at 1, 3 (Nat. Ctr. for St. Cts. & Fed. 
Jud. Ctr. 1975) [hereinafter Appellate Justice 1975]. 
 7. Id. at 3. 
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appellate tribunals . . . into a judicial Tower of Babel.”8 And a 
few months after the 1975 Conference, the Commission on 
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska 
Commission) issued its final report recommending creation of “a 
new national court of appeals, designed to increase the capacity 
of the federal judicial system for definitive adjudication of 
issues of national law.”9 
At the same time, what stands out in the materials for the 
1975 Conference is something that is not there. There is no 
discussion of the interaction between appellate courts and other 
institutions of government, nor is there any reference to the 
effect on appellate courts of the political and societal conflicts of 
the era. Rather, the 1975 Conference treated the appellate court 
system as a self-contained universe that existed largely 
independent of political and social controversies. 
Viewing the appellate scene of today against the 
background of the 1975 Conference, the Steering Committee for 
the 2005 Conference identified three broad topics for discussion 
in the breakout sessions.10 First, there was the overarching issue 
raised by the apparent assumption of the 1975 planners that 
appellate courts carry out their work in isolation from the 
political and social conflicts of their time. No one today would 
accept that picture, but has immersion in controversy changed 
the way appellate courts carry out their business? That is a 
different, and more difficult, question. 
The second topic centered on precedent and appellate 
structure. In sharp contrast to 1975, concern about disuniformity 
in appellate decisions barely registers on the seismometer of 
legal discourse today. This is particularly remarkable at the 
federal level, in view of the fact that the only tribunal with 
 
 8. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After the Trial Court—The Realities of Appellate Review, 
in The Courts, The Public, and the Law Explosion 60, 81 (Harry W. Jones ed., Prentice-
Hall 1965). He added: “The proliferation of utterances could divest any one of these [in-
termediate appellate] courts of significant authority.” Id. 
 9. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and In-
ternal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 208 (1975) [hereinafter 
Hruska Commission Report]. 
 10. The planning of the Conference was a truly collaborative effort. I cannot improve 
on Arthur England’s description of the Steering Committee: “a collection of very bright, 
able, dedicated, and convivial appellate specialists with whom it was a delight to work in-
timately.” England, supra n. 2, at 69. 
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authority to resolve conflicts with nationally binding effect—the 
Supreme Court of the United States—has actually reduced its 
decisional output to half of what it was in 1975.11 Is this a 
problem? And what about uniformity in state systems? Those 
were among the questions we asked the participants to address. 
Finally, there were the issues of volume, process, and 
delegation of responsibility that Professor Meador and others 
were writing about in the 1970s. Since then, although the 
volume of appeals has continued to increase, the sense of crisis 
has almost entirely disappeared. There is little outcry over the 
appellate shortcuts that aroused so much dismay in 1975. We 
see occasional vigorous debates about particular aspects of the 
appellate process—in particular, about rules prohibiting the 
citation of unpublished opinions—but except for one or two 
academics, no one is arguing that the system needs fundamental 
change. 
In the pages that follow, I summarize the discussions in the 
breakout groups on each of these three topics. As one would 
expect, the focus was on today’s practices and problems; 
comparisons with the past were only secondary. Nevertheless, 
the contrast between the preoccupations of 1975 and those of 
2005 provides a useful framework for the Report. 
Throughout this Report I use quotation marks for 
comments by participants. These comments should not be taken 
as verbatim transcriptions of what was said. The words have 
been filtered through the reports of the individual Reporters, 
and, in addition, have been edited for clarity and to avoid 
identifying the speaker.12 Nevertheless, use of the quotations 
preserves some of the immediacy and the informality of the 
small-group setting. Moreover, I use “quotations” only when the 
Reporter’s account appears to reflect a direct quote or close 
paraphrase.13 
 
 11. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 403 [hereinafter Hellman, Shrunken Docket]. 
 12. As Reporter for the Conference, I made a commitment to the participants that I 
would not attribute any comments to particular individuals. Out of caution, I have generally 
eliminated references that would identify the state or court of the speaker. 
 13. It is possible that in editing for clarification, I have inadvertently changed or dis-
torted what the speaker intended to say. I apologize to any participant whose comments 
have been mangled in any way. 
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II. APPELLATE COURTS AS FLASHPOINTS OF CONTROVERSY 
When Justice William O. Douglas retired late in 1975, his 
successor, John Paul Stevens, took his oath only three weeks 
after President Ford announced the nomination. It is hard to 
imagine such a quick succession happening today. Appellate 
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have 
become flashpoints of controversy. In the legislatures, in the 
media, and on the campaign trail, appellate decisions receive 
attention and, often, harsh criticism. The public position of 
appellate courts played no part in the 1975 Conference, but in 
2005 the subject generated extensive discussion. 
A. Tensions between Courts and Legislatures 
One prominent manifestation of the controversial position 
of appellate courts today is the tensions that have developed 
between courts and legislatures. To be sure, the phenomenon is 
by no means universal. In some states, as Conference 
participants reported, “the relationship between legislative and 
judicial branches is relatively harmonious.” But harmony 
appears to be the exception rather than the rule. 
In jurisdictions across the country, legislators have 
threatened—or have actually undertaken—to retaliate against 
appellate courts for their decisions on controversial issues. The 
issues and the forms of retaliation span the spectrum. Here are 
some examples reported by participants: 
 
• State A: The state supreme court, controlled by 
members of one political party, issued a decision in a 
redistricting case declaring unconstitutional a statute 
passed by the legislature, which was controlled by 
the opposite party. The legislature retaliated by 
denying the courts the resources they need. 
 
• State B: The relationship between the legislature and 
the courts is very tense, in large part because of 
school-funding decisions that have forced the 
legislature to appropriate more money for schools 
than it wants to.  The relationship was further 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art52
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aggravated by abortion decisions that were more 
liberal than those of the U.S. Supreme Court and by 
death-penalty decisions that favored defendants.  As 
a result, there is growing legislative opposition to the 
“yes-no” method of electing judges, and proposals 
for more partisan judicial elections may gain 
strength. 
 
• State C: There is a real crisis between the judiciary 
and the legislature.  Judges do not get a salary 
increase unless the legislature approves, and it has 
been seven years since the last increase.  Last year, a 
controversial supreme court justice was up for 
retention, and the speaker of the state house, who is 
at the other end of the ideological spectrum, ran an 
unsuccessful campaign to unseat him.  The speaker is 
now proposing changes to undermine the nonpartisan 
court plan. 
 
• State D: A legislative committee recently 
recommended a $9000.00 pay raise for trial court 
judges, but no raise for appellate court judges.  The 
recommendation was made at a time when there were 
many letters published in the state’s newspapers 
denouncing judicial activism. 
 
• State E: A ruling allowing a lesbian to adopt a child 
prompted a huge political controversy.  There were 
efforts to impeach the judge who had written the 
decision.  The situation ended with a strong 
reaffirmation of the need for an independent 
judiciary, but it was still a very contentious situation. 
 
Apart from specific hot-button issues, participants pointed 
to a number of developments that contribute to tensions between 
courts and legislatures. Here are the Reporters’ summaries from 
two of the groups: 
 
• All participants in the group agreed that appellate 
courts have become the focal point of political 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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controversy. As courts have weighed in on matters of 
social policy, there has often been a backlash in the 
media and, not infrequently, legislative bodies.  
There was a general sense among participants that 
judicial decisions will remain controversial, and 
judges targets for politically motivated attacks, as 
long as judges are required to decide controversial 
issues of public policy. 
 
• Several state court judges noted that in the 
appropriations context, the judiciary “is just another 
agency, not the third branch of government.” There 
was general agreement with this “another agency” 
legislative vision of the judiciary.  State court judges 
stated that there was much tension between 
legislatures and the courts, and it causes judgeships 
to go unfilled and the courts to be underfunded. 
 
Other participants called attention to the effect of “the 
national information grid” on legislative concerns. A state judge 
described the phenomenon and its consequences: 
One of the differences in the criticism and distrust that 
judges experience today is that the national information 
grid, from talk radio to evening cable shows to electronic 
access to journal articles and so on, causes the things that 
any appellate court does to bounce around the country in a 
way that’s exponentially greater than what it was ten years 
ago.  If the Massachusetts court writes an opinion on gay 
marriage, people huddle in party caucuses in my statehouse 
to discuss whether our judges are the sorts that would do 
this, and should we try to pass a constitutional amendment 
now. That just didn’t happen in an earlier age because the 
country moved more slowly. 
So among the political branches it isn’t just worries about 
any individual appellate court; they worry about all of 
them.  When the Ninth Circuit says “under God” has to 
come out of the Pledge, it’s instant news everywhere. And 
the public is even less likely than the elected officials to 
differentiate between the Ninth Circuit and their state 
supreme court. 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art52
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One particular development was emphasized by 
participants from at least half a dozen states: the decline in the 
number of legislators who are lawyers. As one state judge 
commented, “The natural constituency of the judicial branch has 
been shrinking.” This has had unfortunate consequences for the 
judiciary, including the appellate courts. “The legislators lack 
professional understanding of the role of the courts.” “The 
change becomes very significant when the courts approach the 
legislature with needs.” “At least in theory, lawyers should 
understand the need for a strong, independent judiciary and 
should be able to look at a ruling in a case as the product of 
more than simply the policy preferences of the judges.” 
One judge perceived a more subtle consequence. “In my 
experience, the non-lawyer members of the legislature need help 
dealing with the arguments of the lawyer legislators who have 
agendas that they want to advance.” This comment was unique; 
it would be interesting to know whether others have had that 
experience. 
Participants also cited the effect of legislative term limits. 
In one state, “term limits have removed many legislators who 
had built a strong relationship with the courts.” As a result, “the 
legislature is increasingly made up of “high-turnover 30-
somethings who have no feel for what the judicial system is 
about.” 
How can appellate courts combat misunderstanding or 
hostility on the part of legislators? Judges from several states 
offered a variety of suggestions and described a number of 
successful initiatives: 
 
• State A: “There are a few glimmers of hope.  Judges 
have worked with the state bar to encourage lawyers 
to run for office, and judges have had some success 
in enlisting business leaders to come to the defense 
of a nonpartisan court plan.” 
 
• State B: “The supreme court’s rulemaking power 
provides an opportunity to build a stronger 
relationship with the legislature.  The court asked the 
legislature to set the policy and indicated that the 
courts would provide the procedure.  The legislature 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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was so pleased with the process that it gave the 
courts money to carry out the plan.” 
 
• State C: In response to retaliatory action by the 
legislature, “the chief justice has enlisted business 
leaders, lawyers, and others to come to the aid of the 
judicial system.” 
 
• State D: “I suggest that we look at the situation as an 
opportunity for the judges to educate themselves 
about the legislature and for the judges to educate the 
legislators about the courts.  We have found that the 
legislators are delighted to get a ‘back-stage’ tour of 
the court.  And our court has met in open meetings 
with the legislators to discuss issues such as 
legislative interpretation.” 
 
Others spoke in more general terms: “We need to do more 
to educate legislators, put them through a little bit of ‘law 
school.’” “The relationship with the political branches is really 
driven by the personality of the Chief Justice, who has an 
important role to play in maintaining good political relations.” 
B. Election of Judges 
Election of judges has been part of American life since the 
early nineteenth century. However, Conference participants 
pointed to several recent developments that have exacerbated 
concerns about politicization of the appellate judiciary. 
First, as one lawyer observed, “special interest groups” 
focus public attention on “single issues.” Many of these groups 
send questionnaires to judicial candidates, and, as a judge 
reported, “if one doesn’t answer, one gets a bullet on the website 
indicating refusal to answer.” 
Second, as participants in several groups noted, in 2002 the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White,14 holding that the First Amendment limits 
the power of states to restrict speech by candidates for judicial 
 
 14. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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office. One judge said: “It is difficult to see how judges can 
avoid political attacks when they stand for election (or retention) 
just as legislators or other political candidates.  If judges are to 
stand for election, they are going to have to take positions on 
issues, and their rulings will be fair game for campaign attacks.” 
Third, judicial elections in many states have become very 
costly. In one state, as much as $1,000,000 has been spent in the 
campaign for a supreme court position. What makes this 
troubling, of course, is that the candidates raise money from 
lawyers. 
Does the prospect of having to run for reelection or 
retention affect the way appellate judges carry out their work? A 
few judges saw evidence that it does. Said one: “The deepening 
perception that judges decide cases in accord with their personal 
feelings compromises the way that judges do business.” But the 
majority of comments were to the contrary. As one judge 
observed, in a comment echoed by others, “Judges do what they 
think is right without worrying about reelection.” 
But even if judicial elections do not affect courts’ 
decisions, they may have other unfortunate consequences. Over 
the long term, hotly fought campaigns can have a negative effect 
on the way citizens view courts. The prospect of having to run 
for election may deter good people from seeking or accepting 
judicial positions. For example, in one state, the judicial 
selection commission now asks candidates “whether they have 
the stomach to run a campaign after they have been on the bench 
or whether they will bail out on the governor who appointed 
them.” In another state, according to one participant, a person 
who is hostile to the death penalty could not be elected to the 
bench. 
C. Media Coverage and Public Perceptions 
Public response to appellate decisions cannot be considered 
apart from coverage in the media, for the former is heavily 
influenced by the latter. But as one participant observed, “while 
the amount of attention [given by the media] has increased 
significantly, the amount of insight has not.  The increased 
attention to the courts presents a great opportunity, but the 
opportunity is being wasted by coverage that is superficial.” 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Several participants lamented the quality of media 
coverage. Judges and lawyers in one group agreed that the 
media frequently make mistakes in reporting about cases 
because of the need to “dumb it down.” 
One phenomenon that generated discussion in several 
groups is the media’s practice of regularly identifying the 
political affiliation or appointing president of the judge who 
wrote a newly issued opinion. A state judge elaborated: “In the 
past, news reports of court decisions said that ‘the Fifth Circuit’ 
decided X.  Now it is far more likely that a news story will say 
that ‘Judge A, appointed by President Bill Clinton (or by 
President George W. Bush)’ decided X.” The effect is “to push 
toward a cult of personality” and to reinforce the perception that 
judges decide cases in accordance with political affiliation. 
The “national information grid” also came up in this 
context. Again the Massachusetts same-sex marriage case was 
the exemplar. As one state judge said, the decision “had a ripple 
effect on [his] state and others, not from anything that the judges 
did in [his] state, but from concerns about what they might do. 
Blogging and interest groups and a twenty-four-hour news cycle 
all combine to produce a transferability of issues.” 
Does increased media scrutiny have any impact on judicial 
decisionmaking? None of the participants believed that media 
attention changes the outcome of appellate decisions, but some 
pointed to other possible effects. These include the contents of 
opinions, the timing of decisions, and the determination about 
which opinions get published. A state judge said that media 
attention might “change the way that opinions are drafted, 
especially in controversial cases.” In a similar vein, a federal 
judge voiced the suspicion that that, in some of his court’s 
opinions, “extra flourishes have been inserted in the hope of 
attracting media attention.” 
D. Self-Inflicted Wounds and the Role of Civility 
Many of the factors that contribute to the politicization of 
the judiciary are, obviously, beyond the control of the judges. 
But that does not mean that the judges are blameless or that 
there is nothing they can do to improve the situation. One 
participant summed up a widely held perception when he 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art52
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commented that “some of the decline in public respect may be a 
self inflicted wound. Judges bring controversy upon themselves 
by the way they write their opinions.” 
This observation was echoed, with a variety of emphases, 
by many judges (as well as by lawyers and academics). Here are 
some examples: 
 
• “There is a lot of chest-thumping about judicial 
independence, but I think we bring some of [the 
challenges] upon ourselves by the way we write, 
particularly our dissents, where we accuse our 
colleagues in the majority of being political in their 
decisionmaking. And this provides the text for a lot 
of the criticism for those on the outside. We need to 
think about the consequences of the way we express 
our views.” (A state judge.) 
 
• “There is a really bad public perception when you 
see dissents and dissents [from] dissents and 
concurring opinions—they look like the McLaughlin 
group . . . and there’s a perception by the public, it’s 
really horrendous.” (Another state judge.) 
 
• “Judges need to monitor their own words carefully 
and tone down the harshness that has crept into so 
many opinions.  The public perception of the courts 
is really harmed when, for example, a dissenting 
Supreme Court justice criticizes the competence or 
integrity of the majority.” (A federal judge.) 
 
• “There has been a change in tone, and we need to 
think more about the fact that every opinion may be 
amplified through the media.” (Another federal 
judge.) 
 
Participants also pointed to some of the circumstances that 
may account for the increased harshness of judicial rhetoric: 
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• “Law clerks can contribute to the lack of civility.  If 
they perceive that their judge is under attack, their 
reaction is often to return fire.” 
 
• “One thing that may be contributing to the problem is 
time pressures.  The California appellate courts labor 
under a 90-day rule; the judges don’t have time to 
choose their words carefully and monitor each 
other’s work closely.” 
 
• “I think it’s simply another symptom of the entire 
coarsening of the culture [that began with] the events 
of 1968. [In addition to] all the bad things that were 
swept away in that ferment, we swept away some 
good things, and [that includes] the sorts of internal 
restraints that people used to carry around, 
particularly people in positions of authority. . . . But 
[that is not limited to] the legal system; the standards 
are slipping everywhere.” 
 
Judges also suggested that there are ways of avoiding self-
inflicted wounds. Here are some of their comments: 
 
• “Sometimes it takes the intervention of a judge who 
is not on a panel to get the judges who are writing the 
majority and dissenting opinions to ratchet down 
their rhetoric. “ (A federal judge.) 
 
• “Civility used to be a problem on [our court], until 
the judges decided to police themselves carefully.  If 
a judge writes anything that is even the least bit 
unkind, the other judges will pressure the judge to 
change it.” (A state judge.) 
 
• “It’s fairly ordinary, when somebody sends out [a 
draft opinion], and it’s too aggressive, for somebody 
else on the court to either reply in writing or go to the 
other person’s office and say, ‘I suggest you 
reconsider how you said this. The legal point you 
make is good, but [there’s a less aggressive way of 
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writing it].’ And I’d have to say that in our little part 
of the world, people usually react favorably to that.” 
(A state judge.) 
 
• “[There is also] the issue of being respectful towards 
the district courts. . . [Sometimes] I wince when I get 
a draft from another chambers, where I feel that the 
opinion of the district court has not been treated with 
the respect that it deserves. But I’ve never had a 
situation where I’ve said, ‘Don’t you think we might 
say this in a different way?’ and the change hasn’t 
been made.” (A federal judge.) 
 
• “We work very hard institutionally at collegiality 
among ourselves, and I think we’ve kept the sniping 
at each other in opinions to a minimum. When we 
have a problem, we bring it up at a court meeting and 
talk about it.” (A federal judge.) 
 
• “When an opinion strikes a statute down as 
unconstitutional, it should be done with humility and 
respect.” (A federal judge.) 
 
The participants were not unanimous, however. One federal 
judge said: “The idea that judges should craft their opinions to 
make them more palatable to the public is a horrendous 
suggestion.  Where do you stop?  It’s a slippery slope.” But the 
dominant view was that judges can and should think about 
public perceptions—and the possibility of media 
amplification—when they write their opinions. 
E. Improving Public Understanding of the Courts 
Underlying many of the specific points about tensions with 
legislatures, the national information grid, and politicization of 
the judiciary is a concern about public understanding of the 
courts—or rather the lack of understanding. Some participants 
commented specifically about this phenomenon and its causes. 
For example: 
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• “The public raises legitimate questions about whether 
judges are doing their jobs.  Those questions arise 
because anyone outside the process does not know 
the answer to the questions.  The courts need find 
some way to communicate with the public that will 
minimize the ability of cynical public opinion leaders 
to foment misunderstanding.” (A state judge.) 
 
• “The public is buying the claim about judges being 
activist. For the losing side, they want to attribute 
loss to something other than the merits. So you need 
to explain how you got to your decision.” (Another 
state judge.) 
 
• “Everyone around the table would agree that the 
public is woefully uninformed about how courts 
operate. Why haven’t we done more to educate 
journalists?” (A lawyer.) 
 
The groups also considered various methods of remedying 
the situation. Two generated extensive discussion: televising 
oral arguments and finding better ways of explaining court 
decisions. 
1. Televising Oral Arguments 
Justice Stephen Breyer, in response to a question at the 
plenary session, discussed one frequently heard suggestion for 
enhancing public understanding: televising appellate 
proceedings. But Justice Breyer did not support the idea; on the 
contrary, he emphasized the “things that [he was] frightened of” 
if television cameras were allowed in the appellate courtroom.15 
Some participants agreed, at least in part, with the 
reservations voiced by Justice Breyer. A federal judge said that 
he was worried about “grandstanding—i.e., lawyers making jury 
arguments before appellate judges.”  One lawyer reported that 
several of his arguments had been televised; in one, his opposing 
counsel used the opportunity to give a political speech and did 
 
 15. Stephen G. Breyer, Speech, The Future of Appellate Courts (2005 Natl. Conf. on 
App. Just., D.C., Nov. 5, 2005) (copy on file with author). 
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not answer the panel’s questions. A state judge said that the 
press could cause distortions by broadcasting only selected 
excerpts from arguments as news stories. And one of the 
academic participants voiced the fear that, in states where judges 
are elected, candidates might use films from oral arguments in 
election advertisements.  As a result, broadcasting arguments 
might influence judicial decisionmaking. (Note, though, that a 
state judge, in response, expressed disagreement on this point, 
based on experience with televised arguments in that judge’s 
state.) 
These negative comments represented a distinctly minority 
view at the Conference. As one Reporter summarized his 
group’s discussion, “There was a very strong consensus in favor 
of televising appellate court proceedings, and numerous 
examples of favorable experience doing so.” In a similar vein, 
another Reporter said: “Broadcasting appellate arguments 
seemed to be generally acceptable to the group. There has been 
experience with it in several jurisdictions of group members 
without any major adverse consequences.”16 
Several participants specifically supported televising oral 
arguments in the United States Supreme Court. One lawyer said: 
What goes on in the United States Supreme Court is 
inspiring, and the American public should be able to see it.  
Kelo is a great example of an oral argument that should 
have been televised.  There would have been much better 
understanding of the outcome if people had seen that 
argument.17 
Another lawyer added: 
I’ve got a lot of lay friends who watched some of the John 
Roberts confirmation, and aside from the uniform 
comment, including my wife, on how handsome he is, a lot 
of laypeople said he’s so bright that they felt better about 
the Supreme Court knowing that somebody so bright would 
be on the Supreme Court.  And I think if they saw some of 
the arguments there, they’d come away with the same 
 
 16. Many of the participants who supported televising oral arguments in appellate 
courts emphasized that allowing cameras in trial courts—particularly in criminal proceed-
ings—presents very different issues. That aspect of the discussion will not be further 
treated in this Report, but it is important to note that the distinction was widely drawn. 
 17. The reference is to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the eminent 
domain case. 
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feeling—the Justices are serious people trying to do a 
serious job. 
Overall, what stands out is that with a handful of 
exceptions, the participants who spoke on the basis of 
experience said that the much-feared problems had not 
materialized. In one state where supreme court arguments have 
been webcast for five years, a judge said, “It doesn’t seem to 
affect the behavior of Justices. And we haven’t heard from 
lawyers about any adverse reactions.” A judge from another 
state said that his court “provides a gavel-to-gavel feed of all 
proceedings to public television.  The reaction has generally 
been very favorable.” Another state “has had a good experience 
with cameras in the Supreme Court.” 
Some judges, on the basis of their experience, explicitly 
took issue with Justice Breyer. Said one: 
We’ve had tremendous, tremendous, success in [our state] 
with absolute transparency. Every appellate argument in 
every court is streamed live over the internet, Supreme 
Court arguments are live on television, and everything is 
archived. If there’s a question about [what was said], all 
you’ve got to do is click the button, go back and look at it. I 
was disappointed because Justice Breyer immediately went 
to the question of criminal trials.  Well, that’s not what the 
question was. 
Another judge emphasized the benefits of making 
videorecorded oral arguments widely available: 
When you do streaming video or reruns on the community 
access channel, what you get is a relatively small but very 
high quality of audience of lawyers, school children, 
college classes, and journalists from the local press, who 
wouldn’t have covered this case because they wouldn’t 
come to the state capitol to do it. . . . I’ve come to look at 
this very differently because we get so much feedback from 
opinion leaders who watch that stuff.  Legislators watch it, 
political people watch it, and that’s a place where we need 
all the help we can get. . . . If you create your own point of 
access, whether written or video, you do get a pretty good 
bang for a very little buck. 
The participants who spoke on the basis of experience 
generally remained supportive even as they acknowledged 
occasional problems. For example, one judge observed that the 
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media “choose the most salacious cases,” and that the filming 
does not always serve an educational purpose. But the judge also 
emphasized that “filming is done very responsibly because the 
media does not want the filming rights revoked. After 
approximately thirty seconds, one forgets that the cameras are 
rolling.” Another judge said that televising court hearings did 
affect how some judges behaved: “One judge was afraid to ask 
questions, and another was a camera hog. And some of the 
advocates appeared more nervous.” But, overall, the court’s 
experience was described as “good.” And a judge from another 
state added: “Once it becomes routine, those problems 
disappear.  The camera can be concealed, and soon everyone 
forgets it’s there.” 
2. Explaining Court Decisions 
The traditional view is that courts speak only through their 
opinions. Moreover, those opinions generally are written for 
readers trained in the law—primarily lawyers and other judges. 
The task of translating legal prose into everyday language has 
been left to outsiders, particularly the media. This raises the 
question: In an era in which many court decisions are of great 
interest to a broader public, should the courts themselves take 
steps to explain their rulings in a more accessible way? There 
was extensive discussion of this point in the breakout sessions, 
but no consensus. 
Some participants argued that courts should hire public 
information officers or issue press releases. One state judge 
elaborated on this view by comparing the handling of the Bush 
v. Gore litigation in the Florida Supreme Court and in the United 
States Supreme Court: 
Florida had this very able fellow who held regular press 
conferences. He gave the press information, something to 
cover, not in secret, but straightforward explanations of 
what was happening in the Florida Supreme Court today 
and how it related to other cases that were then pending in 
other courts in Florida. Then he came out with the Court-
issued opinions. I know that many judges say, “just read the 
opinion.” Well, nonsense. It’s not a bad thing for somebody 
to be able to point to this or that page and say “what the 
court said about this is such and such.” 
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Contrast that with that incredible scene on the steps of the 
Supreme Court when they handed down the decision. They 
did it late at night when everybody was tired. I was 
watching C-SPAN or CNN or somebody. They had two 
reporters: “You read the first half, and I’ll read the second.” 
It was obliviousness that really passes all understanding. 
At a crucial moment it seemed to me that the level of public 
understanding and acceptance of those decisions had a lot 
to do with—not the only thing, but it had a fair amount to 
do with—the ham-fisted way the Supreme Court handled it, 
and how the Florida court did just the opposite. 
Other state judges described how their courts have taken 
steps to help the public understand their decisions. Said one: 
Our court has a public information officer who is a former 
reporter herself and who has worked well with the media. 
Reporters are now assigned to the court, and they develop 
expertise in covering the court’s work. The reporters really 
try to get it right, and they are getting it right more and 
more. The public seems to be understanding more about 
what judges do. 
Another court has gone even further: 
Our court [now issues] press releases for our highest profile 
cases. They are written with the author of the opinion, a 
member of the court, and they’re approved by the whole 
court before they go out. [The reason we do this is that] the 
opinion is sometimes too complicated and doesn’t really 
say [what the court has decided]. And so this is the 
shorthand way of saying here’s what the court thinks the 
issues are. [These press releases] are greatly appreciated by 
the press and the public, and sometimes get into stories 
almost verbatim because they cut to the chase. 
A federal judge said that his court had obtained some funds 
to hire a public information officer, and it worked well. “The 
person we had was very helpful, but then with budgetary 
cutbacks, we didn’t have the funds.” However, this judge did not 
specify what the public information officer’s responsibilities 
were, and there is reason to doubt that these included issuing 
press releases explaining court decisions. 
Other judges were more skeptical about hiring public 
information officers to explain appellate decisions to the media. 
A federal judge said that press releases inevitably interpret 
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opinions and thereby provide a “spin” on the cases. A state 
judge said that it might be useful for courts to post unofficial 
synopses of cases on the Internet and that his court was 
considering moving in that direction. He acknowledged, 
however, that limiting a case summary to a few sentences could 
pose a risk of distorting the thrust of the opinion. One Reporter 
summarized what appears to be a widely held view: There are 
advantages to providing information, but there are also risks in 
“trying to capture difficult issues in a few words.” 
Several participants suggested that courts could 
communicate better without issuing press releases if judges 
wrote opinions with more of an eye to a general audience. One 
participant said courts should “take great care, particularly in 
politically controversial cases, to write their opinions in ways 
that will help the public understand why the law required the 
disposition the court reached.” A federal judge made the point 
even more emphatically: “There are some cases where you can 
write the opinion [in such a way] that the justification [is] put in 
terms comprehensible to anyone who goes to the trouble of 
finding the opinion. The idea in writing the opinion in that way 
is that it helps to sell the court’s result to the public.” 
3. Other Measures 
Participants also offered other suggestions for improving 
public understanding of the courts. Some focused on the media, 
because, as one judge said, “that is where the public gets most of 
their education about courts.” A recurring theme is that courts 
should “educate journalists, so that they can carry the message.” 
One judge described a “sort of one-day law school for 
journalists.” The court worked with a local university and 
brought in television reporters as well as print journalists. The 
judge elaborated on the benefits of the program: 
In talking about the basic issues, we each learn a lot about 
each other. And one of the things we learned [is that] the 
media, because of budget cuts and otherwise, don’t have as 
many regular people that cover the courts [as they used to, 
so] they have to do that in addition to other assignments. 
And they don’t get special training about the courts, and I 
think [we ought to do] more of that exchange of ideas. 
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But outreach need not be limited to journalists. There was 
wide agreement, as summarized by one Reporter, that “public 
education projects, as well as bench/bar committees, are 
worthwhile in counteracting ignorance or misunderstandings 
about judges and the judicial process.” In another group, a state 
judge described a program that “took the Supreme Court on the 
road.” The judge explained: 
We go into communities and into local court houses. Law-
yers and teachers teach students in advance on the cases. 
The students hear the cases and [they have a chance to talk 
with] the lawyers that just argued the cases. The cases are 
on a fast track to be decided, so they’re decided before the 
school year is over, and the kids then get to talk about the 
case after it’s decided. 
III. PRECEDENT, UNIFORMITY, AND APPELLATE STRUCTURE 
The 1975 conference took place at a time of ferment over 
issues involving precedent and appellate structure. The 
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 
(Hruska Commission) was engaged in a wide-ranging study to 
determine whether the existing structure provided “adequate 
capacity for the declaration of national law.”18 The American 
Bar Association had begun work on standards relating to 
appellate courts, including various approaches to maintaining 
decisional consistency in state judicial systems.19 Institutional 
endeavors such as these provided a focus for discussion that was 
lacking at the 2005 Conference. Rather, the participants talked 
about uniformity, predictability, and the non-structural 
arrangements that might promote or retard those goals. 
A. National Uniformity and the Role of the Supreme Court 
Simultaneously with the planning of the 1975 Conference, 
the Hruska Commission was carrying out its investigation of 
“national appellate capacity.” A few months after the 
 
 18. Hruska Commission Report, supra n. 9, at 217. 
 19. See ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating 
to Appellate Courts § 3.01 (ABA 1977). 
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Conference, the Commission issued its final report. The 
Commission recommended creation of a National Court of 
Appeals to decide questions of national law that were important 
enough to require national resolution, but not necessarily 
important enough to demand the time of the Supreme Court.20 
The debate over national appellate capacity continued for 
roughly the next two decades, particularly in the early 1980s, 
when Chief Justice Burger urged Congress to create an 
“Intercircuit Tribunal” similar in purpose to the National Court 
of Appeals.21 By 1998, however, the issue had disappeared 
almost entirely from the realm of legal discourse.22 Not 
surprisingly, at the 2005 Conference, there was almost no 
discussion of the topic, and there was no support at all for 
creating new structures of the kind proposed by the Hruska 
Commission and Chief Justice Burger. 
One group did address the “national law” issue. The 
Reporter summarized the discussion: 
On the question of conflicts, the group generally agreed 
that long-lasting conflicts do create problems for district 
courts and practitioners. Those conflicts may come from 
intra-circuit decisions, splits between circuits, or from splits 
between state courts interpreting federal law and federal 
district and circuit courts interpreting the same federal law. 
The degree to which a conflict creates a serious problem 
depends in part upon the degree to which the issue 
necessarily crosses jurisdictional boundaries. Some issues 
are clearly national in scope, such as interpretation of class 
action certification requirements; others are not. 
One participant elaborated on this last point: 
I agree that this is a problem in types of cases that are 
national practice cases. For example, in class action 
 
 20. Disclosure note: I served as Deputy Director of the Hruska Commission and helped 
to write its report. 
 21. See e.g. Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 ABA J. 
442 (Apr. 1983). 
 22. The final blow was administered by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, whose Final Report, issued in late 1998, did not even men-
tion the subject. This was particularly telling because the Chairman of the Commission was 
retired Justice Byron White, who had been a strong supporter of the various national court 
proposals. See generally Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, Final Report (Dec. 18, 1998), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/ 
final/appstruc.pdf. 
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practice, we stumbled along with a four-to-four circuit split 
on aggregation for jurisdictional purposes, and it got 
resolved [by the Supreme Court] only this last year, just 
when the issue became less relevant because of legislation. 
There remain significant splits on certification issue, and 
the choice of which circuit to send cases to from the 
Multidistrict Litigation Panel can be outcome 
determinative. This makes forum selection and shopping 
decisive.23 
Yet even in that group, the participants were in general 
agreement that “there aren’t that many conflicts, and there is a 
valid reason for letting conflicts persist while the law 
‘percolates’ before taking the issue to the Supreme Court.” In 
other groups, although there were scattered references to 
conflicts that go unresolved, the “national law” issue received 
even less attention. 
Related issues generated some discussion. For example, a 
few participants expressed dissatisfaction with the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on the cert pool in selecting cases for plenary 
consideration. Said one: 
My biggest frustration is with the process used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in deciding whether to grant cert.  The cert 
pool in which eight of the nine justices participate 
essentially delegates that decision to a single 25-year-old 
law clerk.  Clients have a hard time understanding how 
their lives and fortunes can be placed in the hands of a 
single 25-year-old. 
A participant in another group echoed this concern and 
suggested that reliance on the cert pool has had deleterious 
effects on the kinds of cases selected for plenary review: 
Clients seeking certiorari in the Supreme Court are 
dismayed to learn that, except in exceptional 
circumstances, the Justices decide which cases to take—or 
not take—based only on a “pool memo” from a recent law 
school graduate.  . . . When these graduates, the product of 
a legal education that gives disproportionate emphasis to 
constitutional law, play such an important role in 
determining the cases that the Court accepts for review, 
 
 23. The speaker was referring to the Supreme Court decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), and to the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 12 (2005). 
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perhaps it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the Court’s 
docket is heavy on constitutional law and light on 
commercial law cases. In my view, the Court is making 
itself irrelevant, in part by taking so few cases every year 
and in part by the esoteric nature of much of the Court’s 
docket. There are lots of important issues, in the area of 
commercial law and other disfavored fields, that the Court 
is choosing to ignore. 
But most lawyers did not share this frustration, and no 
judge discussed the point. 
A somewhat larger number of participants expressed 
dismay at the product of some of the cases the Court does take. 
In one group, several conferees said that the Supreme Court 
sometimes issues confusing opinions that actually create 
conflicts in the lower courts. In another, the discussion led to a 
gentle ribbing of Justice Stephen Breyer, who had spoken at the 
plenary session. A judge cited the example of the Establishment 
Clause, which has generated a very large body of decisions over 
the past several decades. The judge asked rhetorically: “Do we 
know anything more about the Establishment Clause now than 
we knew in 1962 or ‘63?” A lawyer responded, “I had a non-
lawyer friend who told me a couple of days ago, if I had the 
chance, ask Justice Breyer about his two decisions on the Ten 
Commandments.”24 Laughter obscured the other responses. 
B. Uniformity and Predictability within Circuits 
In contrast to the lack of interest in the problem of 
“national appellate capacity,” most of the breakout groups 
engaged in extensive discussion of issues relating to uniformity 
of decisions within individual circuits. As several participants 
noted, all circuits follow the rule that decisions of three-judge 
panels are binding on subsequent panels unless overruled by the 
 
 24. In June 2005, a few months before the Conference, the Supreme Court handed 
down two decisions involving Establishment Clause challenges to displays of the Ten 
Commandments. The Court held that one of the displays was constitutional and that the 
other was not. Only Justice Breyer voted in the majority in both cases. For edited versions 
of the two decisions and commentary (including Justice Breyer’s own explanation), see 
Arthur D. Hellman, William D. Araiza & Thomas E. Baker, First Amendment Law: Free-
dom of Expression and Freedom of Religion 974-98 (LexisNexis 2006). 
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Supreme Court or by the court of appeals en banc. But this rule 
does not necessarily preclude the development of conflicts. 
First, a later panel may purport to adhere to the law of the 
circuit, but other members of the court may view the decision as 
creating an inconsistency. As one judge said, “The problem that 
we most often experience is conflicting precedents.  Like most 
circuits, we do not allow one panel to overrule a precedent set 
by another.  So we often have panels straining to distinguish 
their cases from prior circuit decisions.” 
Second, conflicts may develop because the lawyers have 
failed to provide the kind of help that the court needs. As one 
circuit judge said, “At times, lawyers do not bring to the court’s 
attention binding precedent, and thus problems can be created.” 
Advocacy can also fall short in more subtle ways. A lawyer 
commented: 
Part of the reason why there is growth of the appellate 
specialist is that so often the lawyer who tried the case is 
still so angry about that evidentiary point or seventeen 
other [rulings by the trial court]. Hopefully the appellate 
specialist is able to push it down to that point of law that’s 
really likely to do something. But you don’t have to be an 
appellate specialist to be the one to call to the court’s 
attention to the fact that there are discrepancies in the case 
law. [My point is that] the lawyers can play a role through 
careful analysis and presentation of those intracircuit or 
intrastate conflicts, and then you get it worked out. 
And I also think that lawyers can help [in other ways]. 
Generally there are not ten issues in a case; there are the 
one or two real issues on which the case is going to turn. A 
brief that hones down to what the case really is about is 
probably going to do a great deal to help the court [do its 
job]. When I was a law clerk, [there were some briefs that] 
you just looked at and said, “How do I even start in helping 
the judge analyze this?” 
Third, problems can arise when the same issue is presented 
to two or more panels at the same time. Several groups 
discussed the various approaches to this situation. A colloquy in 
one group captured the thrust of the debate: 
Judge 1: “In my circuit, the opinion that is considered 
binding is the opinion issued in the case that was argued 
first, even if it is not the opinion that is published first.” 
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Lawyer 1: “That is not the way the rule works in other 
circuits.  It is the first opinion that is published that is 
considered binding. But under that system, there sometimes 
is a rush to be the first to publish.” 
Judge 2: “That definitely happens in my circuit.” 
Lawyer 2: “Has your circuit considered adopting the first-
argued rule?” 
Judge 2: “No. One problem with that approach is that it 
sometimes takes a panel forever to get an opinion out.  The 
other panels don’t want to hold up their opinions while they 
wait for the first panel to publish.” 
Other circuits take preemptive action to avoid having the 
same issue pending before two different panels. As a participant 
from one such circuit explained, when two or more cases raising 
the same issue are filed at roughly the same time, the clerk’s 
office tries to assign all of the cases to the same panel.  If a later 
appeal is filed raising an issue that is already pending before 
another panel, the clerk’s office will often hold the second 
appeal until the first appeal is decided and then ask for 
supplemental briefing. 
The participants also discussed practices that allow a panel 
to repudiate circuit precedent without the need of rehearing en 
banc. In the Seventh Circuit, a panel may frontally overrule a 
prior decision if it circulates a draft opinion to all active judges 
and “a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue 
of whether the [new] position should be adopted.”25 The Second 
Circuit has a similar procedure, but its availability is 
considerably more limited. As one participant described it, 
The panel will write an opinion narrowing or rejecting the 
prior precedent and will circulate the opinion to the full 
court.  If no judge objects, the opinion will issue with a 
footnote saying that the panel’s decision to reject the 
precedent has been circulated to the entire court and no 
judge has objected.  In this way, the en banc court de facto 
modifies a prior precedent without the need for an en banc 
argument. 
Thus, in the Second Circuit, panel overruling requires 
unanimous consent of the active judges—a sharp contrast to the 
 
 25. 7th Cir. R. 40(e). 
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Seventh Circuit practice, which allows overruling unless a 
majority of the judges object. Further, the Second Circuit 
procedure is generally not used to “frontally overrule” a 
precedent, but rather when the precedent has already been 
weakened by being “distinguished to death.” 
In the Fourth Circuit, if a panel wishes to depart from a 
prior decision, the panel will circulate a letter to the full court 
requesting an initial hearing en banc. But it appears that if a 
majority of the active judges do not vote for the en banc hearing, 
the panel must adhere to the precedent notwithstanding its 
disagreement. In some other circuits, published opinions are 
circulated to the full court before filing “so that potential en 
banc cases can be identified even before an en banc petition is 
received.” However, this procedure does not free panels from 
the obligation to adhere to the law established by prior 
decisions. 
Overall, participants in the Conference—lawyers as well as 
judges—seemed to agree that court of appeals panels generally 
follow circuit precedent.26 At the same time, they recognized 
that there are “conflicts in terms of how the law is applied to the 
facts.” But this phenomenon was not viewed as reflecting any 
kind of systemic defect. One Reporter’s summary is illustrative: 
The group agreed that appellate judges rarely will 
deliberately refuse to follow binding precedent.  Instead, 
conflicts generally arise in how judges apply the law to 
particular facts.  Everyone agreed that in the application of 
law to fact, the outcome in a case could well depend on 
which judges are assigned to the panel.  But the group, 
while clearly troubled by such conflicts, did not think that 
anything realistically could be done.  No one favored the 
use of frequent en bancs to apply the law to specific facts.  
All agreed that such conflicts were an inherent part of our 
judicial system. 
As this quotation suggests, the participants used the term 
“conflict” in a rather broad sense, encompassing unpredictability 
as well as inconsistency. Unpredictability came up in some other 
 
 26. One lawyer said that this is not true of the Ninth Circuit: “In the Ninth Circuit, an 
attorney can find a precedent for just about any proposition. It is very easy to find flatly 
conflicting precedents without any acknowledgment of the conflict by the panels or the en 
banc court. This is terribly frustrating for attorneys and their clients.” No other participant 
voiced this criticism of the Ninth or any other circuit. 
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contexts as well. In particular, a few participants expressed 
concern that extensive use of visiting judges on court of appeals 
panels “reduces predictability.” 
C. Uniformity and Predictability in State Systems 
Not surprisingly, it is more difficult to generalize about 
state appellate courts than about the federal circuits, but here too 
there was little evidence of serious malfunction in the system of 
precedent. 
In most states, the appellate structure resembles that of the 
federal system: “the intermediate courts . . . handle the great 
mass of appeals,” while the supreme court is “reserved for 
decision of the more important cases, usually those of 
significance to the law and the administration of justice and not 
solely of interest to the litigants.”27 But based on the breakout 
session reports, it appears that the actual relationship between 
the state supreme court and the intermediate court is often quite 
different from what we see in the federal system. There is a 
greater sense of participation in a shared enterprise, and little if 
any of the Olympian aloofness that has characterized the United 
States Supreme Court in recent years.28 Here are some 
examples: 
 
• “The judges in [my state’s] intermediate appellate 
courts work very hard to avoid conflicts and will 
sometimes order en banc sua sponte while a panel 
case is pending.  If conflicts persist from one 
intermediate court to another, the [state] Supreme 
Court is good about resolving such conflicts.” (A 
lawyer.) 
 
• “Our state intermediate appellate courts face conflicts 
from time to time.  There are [several] divisions, and 
one is not bound by another.  But this is usually not a 
problem because (1) judges bend over backwards not 
 
 27. Daniel John Meador, American Courts 14 (West Pub. Co. 1991). 
 28. See Hellman, Shrunken Docket, supra n. 11, at 432-38; Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits 
of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging versus Error Correction in the Supreme 
Court, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 271 (2006). 
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to create conflicts, and (2) conflicts that do arise are 
resolved fairly rapidly by the [state] Supreme Court.” 
(A judge.) 
 
• “In my state, one court of appeals cannot overrule 
another.  The courts of appeals decide 1600 to 1700 
cases a year.  Given the volume, sometimes a 
precedent is overlooked; in those instances the state 
Supreme Court lets the intermediate appeals court 
know about it.” (A judge.) 
 
Some participants explicitly noted differences between the 
federal system and state systems that might lead to more 
frequent intervention by the state high court. One participant 
said: 
We should not assume that the federal approach is 
necessarily appropriate for the states.  In the federal system, 
only the Supreme Court can fix conflicts among the 
circuits, and getting Supreme Court review is very difficult. 
In the states, though, the supreme courts have greater 
capacity. Perhaps the states should permit panels of 
intermediate appellate courts to disagree.  That would spur 
the state supreme courts to address issues that they should 
address but might otherwise duck. 
Another participant commented that “state supreme courts will 
grant review for conflicts involving different formulations of a 
legal principle, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court is much less 
likely to do so in that circumstance.” 
Participants also discussed techniques that allow judges on 
an intermediate court to “send a signal” to the supreme court 
that they “are not entirely content with [some] existing 
precedent.” In one state, dissenting opinions serve that purpose; 
there is an appeal as of right to the supreme court if there is a 
dissenting opinion in the intermediate court. Another state uses 
the “special concurrence”: 
In essence the special concurrence states that the court did 
X because existing precedent required it to do so, but the 
court is not comfortable with that result and requests review 
by the Supreme Court. Such special concurrences are 
sometimes written even when the panel is unanimous 
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(because of precedent), and all members of the panel may 
join in the concurrence. 
Other participants offered more mixed assessments of the 
operation of precedent and the governing institutional 
arrangements in particular states. 
 
• A judge: “Our court has a rule that says that one 
panel cannot issue an opinion that conflicts with 
another panel. One effect of this is that it leads some 
judges to spend a lot of time trying to distinguish 
existing precedent. Of course, sometimes it can’t be 
done, and the cases have to be taken en banc.” 
 
• A lawyer: “In [the largest city in my state] there are 
twenty-four appeals court judges.  Lawyers in [that 
city] tell their clients that it is impossible to predict 
the likelihood of success on appeal until the panel is 
selected.  [But this is not a matter of ideology.] 
Unlike the situations described in [two federal courts 
of appeals], all of the appellate court judges are 
[members of the same political party]. In contrast, it 
is possible to give a clearer idea of what the [state] 
supreme court will do.” 
 
• A state supreme court justice: “In my state, panels of 
the intermediate courts are not required to follow 
each other’s precedents.  When a conflict develops, 
the supreme court will take the case.” An 
intermediate court judge from the same state (but a 
different small group): “It is a problem when 
intermediate courts in the state have conflicts that are 
not resolved by our supreme court.” 
 
But the overall impression that emerges from the breakout 
session reports is that the system of precedent works pretty 
much as it should. The point is illustrated by these comments: 
 
• A lawyer: “I’ve found that occasionally, within a 
jurisdiction, you’ll find inconsistency, but generally 
it gets resolved fairly quickly once it’s pointed out, 
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so I’m not sure it’s as big of an issue as some make it 
out to be. Seems like, if you tell the [state] Supreme 
Court, ‘Hey, you’ve got two cases, and they seem to 
say opposite things,’ in the third case, they tend to 
deal with it; so I think it’s just kind of a function of a 
growing number of judges and cases that you’re 
going to get those inconsistencies, and I don’t see a 
problem getting them worked out.” 
 
• An intermediate court judge: “Our court has a 
process in place to avoid creating conflicting 
precedents; that is the primary use to which we put 
our central legal staff.  I don’t think that they catch 
every potential conflict, but the existence of 
conflicting precedents is not cited frequently as a 
basis for granting reargument.” 
 
• A Reporter (summarizing several comments within 
the group): “It is not common for conflicts among 
panels of intermediate state courts to remain unfixed. 
Either a state will follow the horizontal-precedent 
rule and conflicts will not develop, or the state will 
not follow the horizontal-precedent rule and the 
supreme court will fix the conflicts that arise.” 
 
D. The Non-Precedential Precedent 
Based on what I have reported thus far, it would seem that 
the system of precedent operates fairly smoothly in both state 
and federal courts notwithstanding the volume of appeals. But 
we have not yet reckoned with the phenomenon of the non-
precedential precedent—in common parlance, the unpublished 
appellate opinion.29 
 
 29. The term “non-precedential precedent” was first used by Judge Robert Sprecher of 
the Seventh Circuit at a hearing of the Hruska Commission in 1974. See William M. 
Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication 
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1167, 
1167 (1978). 
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“Unpublished” is of course a misnomer.30 In all circuits and 
in many states, “unpublished” opinions are readily available on 
court websites and on Lexis and Westlaw. Sometimes (as in the 
federal system) they are published in bound printed volumes. 
Thus, the problem is not that unpublished opinions are literally 
unpublished or inaccessible. Rather, as participants pointed out, 
unpublished opinions implicate concerns about uniformity and 
predictability in three interrelated ways.31 
First, unpublished opinions are not treated as binding 
precedent. Even if an unpublished opinion appears to present the 
identical issue in an identical factual setting, a later panel is not 
obliged to follow it. 
Second, in many appellate courts, published opinions are 
circulated in draft form to all members of the court before they 
are released to the public. Unpublished opinions are not. Thus, 
off-panel judges do not have an opportunity to review the 
opinion and identify possible conflicts with existing precedent. 
Third and most critically, when an opinion is designated as 
“not for publication,” the panel is permitted—and indeed often 
encouraged—to provide only a skeletal statement of the facts 
(perhaps not even that) and a conclusory statement of the 
rationale.32 One consequence of this format is that, as a state 
judge observed, there is very little that litigants can cite in future 
disputes. What is more important, neither litigants nor anyone 
else can determine, simply from reading the opinion, whether 
the panel has failed to follow a precedent on point or has 
otherwise created a conflict. 
In this light, it is not surprising that several lawyers in the 
breakout sessions voiced the concern that unpublished opinions 
are used as a device to avoid controlling precedents. Said one: 
“One hears about it anecdotally that panels wanted to avoid the 
law of circuit, so they decided not to publish.” Said another: 
 
 30. See Stephen L. Wasby, Publication (Or Not) of Appellate Rulings: An Evaluation 
of Guidelines, 2 Seton Hall Cir. L. Rev. 41, 42-43 & n. 4 (2005). 
 31. In planning the 2005 Conference, the Steering Committee made a considered deci-
sion to de-emphasize the subject of unpublished opinions. This Report deals with the topic 
only in the present context. 
 32. The Ninth Circuit offers this model for treating an issue in an unpublished opinion: 
“Defendant’s statements were volunteered rather than made in response to police question-
ing, and were therefore admissible. U.S. v. Cornejo, 598 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir. 1979). 
AFFIRMED.” 9th Cir. General Orders 4.3.a (“Memoranda Dispositions”) (2005). 
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From my perspective, there are lots of cases where what 
appears to be happening is that the court is avoiding a 
certain result by issuing an unpublished opinion. [The 
proliferation of] unpublished opinions creates the 
perception that it’s worth taking a chance on an appeal 
because you might be the one who gets an unpublished 
disposition going your way. 
The judges in the groups generally took the position that 
unpublished opinions are not used in cases that do not warrant 
them. As one judge said of his own court, “The judges play it 
straight.” But comments by other judges lend some support to 
the lawyers’ concerns. One state judge described unpublished 
opinions as “the elephant’s burial ground for bad cases.” 
Another state judge said: 
It used to be that “hard cases make bad law.” Now “hard 
cases make unpublished opinions.” There is a temptation to 
duck difficult issues by addressing them in unpublished 
opinions, and [my court] sometimes succumbs to that 
temptation. 
One federal judge said that if a panel on his court disagreed 
with a prior published opinion, it might use “an unpublished, 
non-citable opinion in order to achieve a just result without 
running afoul of the first-panel rule.” But no other judge, state or 
federal, made a comment along those lines. 
If unpublished opinions are being widely used—as this 
judge suggests—”to achieve a just result without running afoul 
of the first-panel rule,” this would obviously be a cause for 
concern. What is at stake is not so much the fabric of precedent 
as the basic responsibility of courts to treat like cases alike. 
Based on the breakout session reports, it is impossible to reach a 
conclusion on this point; the material is simply too sketchy. But 
it is worth emphasizing that even the lawyers who expressed 
greatest concern about the misuse of unpublished opinions 
recognized that a supposedly controlling precedent “may not in 
actuality be all that controlling.” That is, there may be 
superficial similarities to a published opinion, but there are also 
differences. Those differences mean that the panel probably has 
not failed in its obligation to treat like cases alike. 
The more complex question is whether appellate courts, in 
withholding so many decisions from the corpus of binding 
precedent, are being faithful to what one participant called “the 
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way of the common law.” On this point the debates at the 
breakout sessions mirrored those that have taken place in many 
other forums. The following exchange from one group (only 
slightly edited) gives a sense of the competing views: 
Judge A: “What is the conceivable value of the one 
thousandth precedent on the standard of review for a 
summary judgment?” 
Lawyer B: “If the law is being applied to a unique set of 
facts, it could have value.” 
Lawyer C: “Why not let the lawyers decide if it has value?” 
Judge D: “The bar would be much better off doing 
traditional legal research using published precedent.” 
Judge E: “At common law, every decided case was 
available.  Courts did not distinguish between correcting 
error and establishing precedent.” 
Judge F: “The problem today is the availability of computer 
research.  Briefs that string-cite seven cases for every point 
are not useful to the court.  Lawyers should reason by 
analogy, not example. More examples are not useful.” 
Lawyer G: “That doesn’t give much credit to appellate 
lawyers.  I’m not going to win my cases by citing a lot of 
sludge.  I’m going to cull out the most persuasive 
authority.” 
Another group took the discussion one step further, as the 
Reporter’s summary indicates: 
The group recognized that the way of the common law is to 
perform both functions—correcting error and declaring the 
law. Indeed, the fine factual distinctions that lead to 
unpublished opinions are the heart of the common law. And 
from the standpoint of the practicing bar, opinions that 
draw fine factual distinctions are the very opinions that 
lawyers need to give better guidance to clients. 
But the account cannot end there. Several judges made the 
point that they “could not possibly vet all of the decisions” that 
their colleagues hand down. A federal judge commented: 
“Publication is a signal that we’ll stand behind every word of the 
opinion; it’s just too hard to keep up with [everything that every 
judge writes for the court].” A state judge agreed: “As a lawyer I 
would have thought that everything should be published. My 
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perspective changed as an intermediate appellate judge. In that 
position you don’t have the time to think through the precise 
language that you use in every decision.” The federal judge 
added: “Or to worry about the language that your colleagues 
use.”  And if that is the reality, is it accurate to say that a lawyer 
could “give better guidance to clients” based on the “fine factual 
distinctions” drawn in an opinion designated as “not for 
publication”? 
The arguments about unpublished opinions can easily call 
to mind the labyrinthine drawings of M.C. Escher: Just when 
you think you are looking at a different level of the structure, 
you realize that you’re actually back where you started. It is not 
surprising that the participants in the 2005 Conference did not 
solve the puzzle. 
E. The Significance of Conflict and the Role of Precedent 
At a conference on appellate courts, it is only natural to 
look closely at the role of precedent. And in view of the history 
recounted at the start of this Report, it was to be expected that 
the planners for the 2005 Conference would focus particularly 
on issues of uniformity and predictability in appellate decisions. 
Yet as I review the breakout session reports, what stands out is 
skepticism about the salience of conflict and even about the 
importance of precedent. This is evident in some of the 
comments I have already quoted, but the point emerged quite 
directly in an exchange in one of the groups: 
A trial judge: “I really resonated with what [one of the 
plenary speakers] said about the different degrees of 
precedent and the different kinds of issues. If there’s a 
discrete issue on which there’s [controlling precedent], then 
it’s easy: you follow it, like it or not, and then you go on to 
the next case and the next issue. But I’ve found both as a 
lawyer and as a trial judge that there are many issues on 
which the precedents aren’t totally controlling. They give 
you values, preferred values, or [they point you to] the 
weight of certain factors [or] multi-factored tests which are 
not controlling in the sense that they end your analysis. [In 
that situation], the lawyers as advocates ought to be able to 
argue from the force that the opinions give to how they 
apply in the particular circumstances of this case. And I as 
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a judge have the obligation and the privilege of explaining 
why I think those values apply in [one way and not 
another]. And [if that means a degree of uncertainty], I’m 
OK with that.” 
A lawyer: “I agree with that totally. I think this idea that 
that we need all these precedents for dictating a particular 
result [is just not correct]. I think there’s far more of danger 
that you get a lot of cases that end up saying something on 
the way to a result that ends up inappropriately binding 
lower courts down the road.” 
Another lawyer: “On the idea of precedent, [another of the 
plenary speakers] has a good way of describing it. He says, 
‘We’re still calling it law school; it ought to be “fact 
school,”‘ because so much of the law is driven by the facts. 
I agree with that. It’s rare that I have conflicting precedents 
that I can’t get around by saying, ‘Your facts and my case 
might be different.’” 
A state appellate judge: “You’ve really said what I had not 
said as an appellate judge, which is that I think we ought to 
be careful about breathing life into this illusion that on 
every given statement of facts there is a controlling law. 
But we don’t have Hammurabi’s Code, thank goodness; we 
don’t have that kind of system of law and, you know, those 
of us who believe in the common law tradition ought not 
forget the value of that. The citizenry tends to think–maybe 
from watching Judge Judy or reading newspapers–that on 
every given dispute, there is a controlling point of law; 
well, it’s an absurd illusion, because why would you have 
courts and lawyers, if that were the case?” 
Comments like these help to explain why the various 
proposals for a National Court of Appeals or an Intercircuit 
Tribunal never gained any real traction among judges and 
lawyers. The point is not that precedent is unimportant. The 
point, rather, is that in the cases that claim the time of judges 
and lawyers, precedent does not “end [the] analysis;” it simply 
provides a starting-point. Enlarging the corpus of authoritative 
precedents may move the starting-point in one direction or the 
other, but it does not substantially alter the process that judges 
and lawyers must engage in. 
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IV. VOLUME, PROCESS, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION 
As already noted, a central theme of the 1975 Conference 
was the effect of the “staggering inflation in caseload” on the 
appellate process. The Conference briefing book painted a bleak 
picture: “[N]one of the options for dealing with increased 
caseload is likely to be attractive. . . . An important point of 
beginning . . . is that there is no wholly benign solution. The 
price can be paid in one or more of several currencies, but pay 
we must.”33 And the threat was not simply to the quality of the 
process. Professor Paul D. Carrington, in his report on those 
breakout sessions, described the far-reaching consequences that 
the participants feared: “For a judge to serve only as an agent of 
quality control and to provide a visible front for an otherwise 
faceless apparatus involves not only a departure from tradition, 
but also a real sacrifice in the human sensitivity of the 
government.”34 
In 1985, ten years after that first Conference, Judge Richard 
Posner published a book with the title The Federal Courts: 
Crisis and Reform. In it, he noted the particular difficulty of 
dealing with increases in caseloads at the appellate level: You 
cannot simply add judges without generating adverse 
consequences somewhere in the appellate hierarchy. Judge 
Posner acknowledged that judges and commentators had been 
complaining about caseloads for twenty-five years, but, he said, 
this time “the wolf really does seem to be at the door.”35 
Fast-forward now to 2005, or rather 2004, when the 
Steering Committee started planning the 2005 Conference. 
There was no widely shared sense of crisis such as the one that 
existed in 1975 and for some years thereafter. No one was 
saying that “there is no wholly benign solution” to the problems 
of appellate courts or that “pay we must” for the consequences 
of volume. 
 
 33. Appellate Justice 1975, supra n. 6, at vol. I (Summary and Background) 3 (empha-
sis in original). 
 34. Paul D. Carrington, Report on Group Discussions, in Appellate Justice 1975, supra 
n. 6, at vol. V (Supplement, Proceedings, and Conclusions)  65. 
 35. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 317 (Harvard U. Press 
1985). 
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The absence of a sense of crisis was one of the things the 
Steering Committee focused on in planning the 2005 
Conference. After all, caseloads did not decline. In most courts, 
particularly in the federal system, they continued to increase. 
Few appellate courts added any significant number of new 
judges. So if the wolf was really tearing the door down in 1975 
or 1985, by 2005 the door should have been no more than a pile 
of splinters, and the wolf should have been sitting in the center 
seat, the master of the courthouse. 
But almost no one thinks that that is the reality today. So 
one of the things we hoped to accomplish with the 2005 
Conference was to find an answer to the question: What did 
happen between 1975 and 2005? 
There are many possible explanations, and they are not 
mutually exclusive, but for purposes of this Report I will 
concentrate on two points at opposite ends of the spectrum. 
One possibility is that there never really was a crisis. There 
was change, and there was growth, but there was also 
adaptation. People overreacted at the time because the 
phenomenon of rapid growth was new, and its consequences 
could not be foreseen. Moreover, some courts responded to 
increased caseloads with innovative techniques and practices. 
Most lawyers respect tradition, and many mistrust change. It 
would not be surprising if people overreacted, not only to the 
increased volume, but also to the measures taken to cope with 
that volume. 
If that is the explanation, we do not have to worry. But 
there is another possibility: That the quality of appellate justice 
has deteriorated, but the participants in the system have not 
noticed any falling-off. They have not noticed it because it has 
happened so gradually, and also because the measures that were 
initially adopted as stopgaps—as triage, to use a familiar 
metaphor—have become accepted as the norm. In other words, 
we’ve lost something valuable that we used to have, but we 
don’t miss it (or most of us don’t) because we don’t realize that 
we’ve lost it. 
To determine which of these explanations is closer to the 
truth, the Conference proceeded in two steps. First, we invited 
some outstanding plenary speakers to present facts and figures 
as well as their hypotheses. Second, we used the breakout 
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sessions to get the individual and collective perceptions of 
participants in the system: the judges and the lawyers. 
The lead plenary speaker was none other than Judge 
Posner. But between 1985 and 2005 his own perception had 
changed substantially. The second edition of his book, published 
in 1996, was not subtitled “Crisis and Reform”; its subtitle was 
“Challenge and Reform.”36 
What Judge Posner said at the 2005 Conference was that, 
contrary to dire predictions in the 1970s (and, he might have 
added, his own comments in 1985), the increased caseload per 
judge has been accommodated with relatively little difficulty by 
a number of changes that enhance judicial productivity. He 
listed several of these changes: 
 
• curtailment in the frequency and length of oral 
argument; 
 
• more law clerks; 
 
• greater use of staff attorneys; 
 
• better screening of judicial candidates; and 
 
• advances in information technology. 
 
Judge Posner also said that appellate judges were underworked 
in the 1950s, so that there was capacity to deal with increased 
caseloads without corresponding increases in judgeships. 
Finally, Judge Posner cited statistics showing that, at least in 
state courts, the volume of appeals has leveled off in recent 
years.37 
Much of the discussion in the breakout groups—even when 
other issues were ostensibly on the table—sheds light on the 
correctness of Judge Posner’s assessment. I begin with some 
 
 36. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform (Harvard U. Press 
1996). 
 37. See Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State Courts 
over the Last Half Century, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 133, 134 (2006). As Judge Posner 
noted, state court data were unavailable for the period before 1987. Id. 
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general perceptions, then turn to some of the particular 
developments on which participants expressed their views. 
A. Accommodation or Surrender? 
In asserting that courts have accommodated increased 
caseloads through changes that enhance judicial productivity, 
Judge Posner was actually putting forward two propositions. 
Explicitly, he was saying that the various developments that he 
listed have, in fact, made appellate judges more productive. 
Implicitly, he was saying that this enhanced productivity has 
been achieved with little if any harm to other values served by 
the system. I did not expect the first proposition to generate 
much disagreement, and it did not. I expected the second 
proposition to be at least somewhat more controversial, and it 
was. 
The opposing view was stated forcefully by another 
prominent federal appellate judge. (I’ll call this judge “the 
dissenting judge.”) The dissenting judge asserted that “there is a 
crisis,” and that the shortcuts taken to accommodate the crisis 
are “appalling.” Turning to particulars, the dissenting judge said 
that in the substantial majority of cases today, there is no oral 
argument, and the attorneys, after submitting their briefs and 
getting an opinion, have no idea whether anyone read or 
understood their contentions. Rather strikingly, this judge 
attributed the lack of agitation about the deterioration of the 
decisionmaking process to the “docility of the bar.” 
I wish I could say unequivocally that there was a consensus 
in support of one view or the other, but there was not. My sense 
is that there were more who agreed with Judge Posner than those 
who disagreed, but certainly there was not unanimity. Moreover, 
the reports from the breakout sessions point to a threshold 
difficulty in making any kind of overall assessment, namely that 
the situation varies enormously from one court to another. Some 
judges feel besieged; others feel no more than the ordinary 
pressures of an important job in a profession that requires a 
certain level of intensity and application. 
It is particularly difficult to generalize about state appellate 
courts. Each state is different. State supreme courts, most of 
which can control their dockets, face far fewer problems than 
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state intermediate courts, which are courts of mandatory 
jurisdiction. In addition, no state except California and perhaps 
Texas had more than a handful of representatives at the 
Conference. 
Another obstacle to generalization is that, not surprisingly, 
lawyers and judges often differed in their assessments. In 
particular, judges were generally confident that they have 
avoided undue delegation to staff; lawyers tended to have some 
doubts. 
B. Oral Argument 
One of the changes that Judge Posner cited as enhancing 
judicial productivity is the curtailment in the frequency and 
length of oral argument. These are really two distinct 
phenomena, and I shall discuss them separately. 
In connection with the denial of oral argument, several 
participants pointed out that, at least in the federal courts, a very 
large percentage of appeals—more than fifty percent in one 
circuit—are filed by pro se litigants. Oral argument is almost 
never allowed in those cases, so if you look only at counseled 
cases, the drop in oral argument is not nearly as steep as the 
overall figures suggest. 
How valuable is oral argument? We must distinguish 
between instrumental and symbolic purposes. Some participants 
emphasized the functional utility of oral argument. There were 
several comments to the effect that “mistakes are more likely in 
cases that are not orally argued,” in part because “often, the 
written briefs are like ships passing in the night.” In a different 
vein, a state judge observed: “Oral argument helps to focus the 
judges, since they are all hearing the answers to questions at the 
same time.” A federal judge said: “It changes the judge’s minds 
in five to ten percent of the cases.  Also, the level of preparation 
by the judges is higher when there is oral argument.” Another 
federal judge summarized a widely held reaction: 
Oral argument is the first opportunity the judges in [my] 
circuit have to “confer” with each other on a case.  Often, 
there are still questions remaining despite reading the 
briefs.  But most oral argument is not well done by the 
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lawyers. It rarely changes anyone’s mind, but may affect 
how the opinion is written. 
As this last comment indicates, even judges who saw value 
in oral argument also acknowledged its limitations. But judges 
and lawyers alike emphasized that oral argument has value even 
if it does not affect the decision. A recurring theme is that oral 
arguments help to maintain public confidence in the system. A 
federal judge said: “Oral argument is important from the 
perspectives of making the appellate process visible and making 
appellate judges accountable. Otherwise, you could be dead, and 
nobody would know it, because you never appear in public.” As 
a state judge commented, “Lawyers who have oral argument feel 
that they have been heard.” A lawyer added: “It is the one point 
of face-to-face contact between the public—especially the 
clients—and the appellate judges.” This focus on client 
perspective was widely embraced. Several participants said that 
if courts offered a choice between having oral argument and 
getting a written opinion, lawyers would probably opt for the 
opinion, but the client generally would choose the argument. 
Does this suggest that courts have gone too far in cutting 
back on oral argument? Not necessarily. My sense is that with 
the possible exception of some lawyers in the Eleventh Circuit 
(and I don’t know if this is a majority view), few of the lawyers 
in the breakout groups felt that oral argument had been denied in 
a case that they thought really deserved it. But it may be that the 
lawyers whose cases are most likely to be sent to a screening 
panel without oral argument were under-represented at the 
Conference.38 (The Invitations Committee tried very hard to get 
them, but those efforts were not always successful.) 
Several judges made the point that the decision to forego 
oral argument is not always made by the court; sometimes it is 
the lawyers who opt to submit the case on the briefs. For 
example, a judge on a state intermediate court said that his court 
allows oral argument in any case where it is requested, but that it 
is now requested in roughly forty percent or less, down from 
around sixty percent. Several participants (including lawyers) 
criticized the practice of waiving oral argument. Said one: “It’s 
hard to believe that anyone who appeals a case doesn’t 
 
 38. In particular, there were few lawyers from Public Defender offices, state or federal. 
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recognize that he or she is sending a tremendous message to a 
court by not requesting argument.” 
There was also some interesting discussion of cutbacks in 
the length of oral argument. Perhaps not surprisingly, this was 
one area where the judges saw things differently from the 
lawyers. The judges were confident that they could get what 
they needed from oral argument even in ten minutes. They 
pointed out that extended argument is unnecessary if both the 
judges and the lawyers are well prepared. Several judges also 
emphasized that if in the course of argument it became clear that 
more time was needed, it would be granted. 
In contrast, the lawyers identified a number of problems 
with extremely brief arguments. One lawyer said that answering 
a single question from a judge could take up the entire allocation 
of time. Several lawyers wondered about having to travel long 
distances for a brief argument, especially if the judges did not 
end up asking any questions. 
There was the further question: How much time do the 
judges really save by cutting back on the length of argument? A 
partial answer is that in courts where some or all judges must 
travel to the argument site, there are substantial efficiencies in 
reducing the number of weeks of argument, or the number of 
days that the judges must be away from their home chambers. 
After all, even with laptops, email, and mobile phones, travel 
time is surely less productive for judges than time in chambers. 
C. Staff Attorneys and Screening 
Another of the changes that Judge Posner listed as 
“enhancing judicial productivity” is greater use of staff 
attorneys. I suspect that many of the Conference participants 
who heard that remark wondered: Exactly how does that 
happen? If the staff attorneys help the judges to make more 
efficient use of the time they spend on cases, that’s one thing. 
But if the staff attorneys are doing work that the judges ought to 
be doing themselves, that’s something else. 
This, too, is an area in which judges and lawyers had 
different perceptions. Judges expressed confidence that they are 
using staff appropriately and that there is no danger of excessive 
delegation based on their current practices. Lawyers were more 
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agnostic. I use that word, rather than “skeptical,” because what 
lawyers see is that judges are (in their view) making errors or 
giving short shrift to appeals. But they have no way of knowing 
whether this is because of overdelegation or some other failing. 
One of the most important functions of staff attorneys is 
that of screening cases for disposition without oral argument. 
Judges from several courts emphasized that even after a case has 
been placed on the non-argument track, a single judge can 
“bump” the case to the argument calendar. Most of the judges 
were confident that this backstop avoids undue delegation at the 
screening stage. But they acknowledged that there are 
differences in the “degree of comfort” with screening practices. 
Screening by staff attorneys is by no means universal, 
however. Judges in other courts (state and federal) emphasized 
they had not delegated the screening function, and that only 
judges “decide what track every case is going to go on.” Some 
of these judges indicated that they viewed screening by staff as 
an improper form of delegation. 
Staff screening is often—though not invariably—associated 
with staff preparation of draft dispositions. Judges from several 
courts took pains to assure lawyers that in cases selected for the 
screening track, the staff “doesn’t even begin drafting 
dispositive orders until a screening panel has given them 
direction about what to do.”  But in other courts, staff attorneys 
routinely prepare draft dispositions in advance of judicial 
consideration. 
This latter group includes the largest of the federal courts of 
appeals, the Ninth Circuit. The breakout groups at the 
Conference included several judges from that court. Based on 
their comments and other sources, it is possible to offer a rather 
complete picture of the process. Here is the way it works. 
A three-judge screening panel meets at the courthouse in 
San Francisco. Sometimes one judge will participate by video 
conferencing from his or her home chambers in another city. 
The staff attorneys present the cases orally, along with a draft 
memorandum disposition. The judges can ask questions, and the 
record is there on the table for them to leaf through. If the judges 
want to see a particular exhibit, the staff can get it for them. 
Using this process, a screening panel can dispose of up to sixty 
cases in a day. If the panel sits together for a week, as typically 
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the panels do, the three judges can dispose of 300 cases. As in 
other courts, a single judge can send a case to the argument 
calendar. 
Some attorneys find it troubling that judges would not read 
the briefs and the record in a case, but only a staff memorandum. 
In fact, in the Ninth Circuit (and other courts that follow this 
approach), the judges do not even read a staff memorandum; the 
process is entirely oral. On the positive side, all three members 
of the panel focus on the cases at the same time in the same 
physical (or occasionally electronic) space. This makes it very 
easy for any one judge to express reservations about the 
proposed disposition, and, if the judge is not satisfied with the 
response, to knock the case off the screening calendar. In 
contrast, in a “serial screening” court, the case files are sent to 
each of the three judges on the panel in sequence. Perhaps the 
judges read the briefs, but there would be no opportunity for 
them to discuss the cases, because by the time Judge B looks at 
the file, Judge A has long forgotten the case. 
Apart from the merits of the various approaches to 
screening, participants flagged other concerns raised by the use 
of staff attorneys. Judges acknowledged that “staff attorneys 
develop expertise in different kinds of cases, and they may 
become a little cynical about certain kinds of cases they see 
frequently.”  “Career staff modifies and changes the work 
product” and “tends to allow judges to become more lazy in 
their role.” And some lawyer participants had doubts about the 
practice itself. As one lawyer said, “Attorneys want a fair 
opportunity to persuade the judges of their correctness of their 
clients’ position.  Summary dispositions, especially when 
screening attorneys are heavily involved, deny attorneys that 
opportunity.” 
Other attorneys reported “relatively low levels of 
indignation about the practice [of screening] on the part of 
appellate lawyers who have come to expect it.” But low 
expectations may not be the only reason for acceptance. Judges 
made a number of points that may help to explain the absence of 
indignation: 
 
• A very large proportion of the cases that are handled 
by staff attorneys are pro se cases. The briefs 
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probably aren’t going to be very helpful, and in any 
event they will certainly benefit from thorough 
review by staff attorneys. 
 
• Many of the appeals (including the counseled 
appeals) raise identical issues—issues that may have 
been definitively resolved by a previous panel. Use 
of staff attorneys enables the court to benefit from 
economies of scale. 
 
• In state intermediate appellate courts, public 
defenders “have to operate under the Anders system,” 
which means that a high proportion of criminal 
appeals are frivolous or nearly so.39 
 
• Petitions for rehearing help the judges determine if 
there are systemic problems with quality. 
 
Judges also offered a number of suggestions for improving 
the operation of screening systems and staff attorney offices, 
either to enhance efficiency or to avoid undue delegation: 
 
• Frequent rotation of screening panels produces a 
dynamic that keeps both judges and staff attorneys 
from falling into a routine that produces too-easy 
acceptance of staff recommendations. 
 
• Regular and frequent turnover among the staff 
attorneys serves a similar purpose. 
 
• Staff attorneys can be particularly useful in handling 
non-merits matters that would otherwise take up 
judicial time, e.g. attorney’s fee applications. 
 
• Petitions for rehearing in nonargued cases should be 
 
 39. The reference is to Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Under Anders, if counsel 
for a criminal defendant “finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious ex-
amination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That 
request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that 
might arguably support the appeal.” Id. at 744. 
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reviewed by a different staff attorney than the one 
who worked on the case originally. 
 
The issue of undue delegation to staff was often linked with 
concerns about undue delegation to a single judge on the court. 
A state judge made the point this way: 
There’s a real danger that what’s supposed to be a three-
judge process becomes a one law clerk process, because it’s 
too easy for a judge to simply adopt the work of a law 
clerk, which is then passed along to the other chambers 
where judges are likely to essentially rubber stamp.  For me 
a big part of the job is to figure out which of my 
colleagues’ opinions I need to take a closer look at in order 
to decide whether I can join it.  This is the case in both 
argued and non-argued cases. 
D. Law Clerks and Opinion Drafting 
Appellate judges today depend heavily on assistance from 
law clerks, particularly in the drafting of opinions. That is a fact 
that no one would deny. But does that kind of delegation pose a 
threat to the proper performance of the judicial function? That 
question generated extensive discussion in the breakout groups, 
with no clear answer. 
Several participants—including both judges and lawyers—
pointed out that assistance in drafting is commonplace elsewhere 
in the legal profession, particularly in the higher reaches. One 
judge asked rhetorically, “Do senior partners in law firms write 
their own briefs in all the cases where their names are on the 
bottom?” A lawyer in the group expressed agreement: 
What you say is so true.  It is very strange to me that the 
private bar would be so suspicious of [law clerk drafting] 
when, at least in large law firms, that’s exactly the way 
they prepare the briefs to begin with.  One of the reasons I 
left a large firm was I was doing the administering and I 
never could read the case law myself! 
Although the judges described a variety of practices, they 
overwhelmingly expressed confidence that they had not 
delegated any core judicial functions in the preparation of 
opinions. Here are comments by some federal judges: 
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• “Judges [on my court] do use law clerks to do first 
drafts of opinions, but judges give those drafts 
careful attention.” 
 
• “I’m comfortable with using a bench memo as the 
initial basis for the opinion.  After conference I write 
an initial memo to the rest of the panel describing in 
some detail the panel discussion concerning what we 
agreed to do. This memo forms the basis on which a 
clerk is to create a draft.” 
 
• “I use my law clerks to take a ‘first cut’ at tasks like 
doing legal research; I retain for myself the ultimate 
function of interpreting cases and statutes.” 
 
• “I find it very useful to have the clerk set out the 
pertinent facts, describe the issues raised, and take a 
first stab at applying applicable precedent to those 
issues.  But I do a fair amount of reorganizing of 
clerk drafts, I make substantial revisions to almost 
every paragraph, and about the only statements of 
black-letter law that I may leave untouched are 
boilerplate, such as standard of review. In most 
opinions there are only a few sentences that are the 
key to the analysis, and I almost always am the 
ultimate drafter of that language.” 
 
Some judges suggested that the present system may 
actually be preferable to the traditional model: 
 
• “I love to write; I’d rather write than do anything.  
[As for reliance on clerks,] I basically rewrite eighty 
percent of the average published opinion issued 
under my name.  There’s a danger in writing the 
opinion yourself and then sending clerks off to find 
law to support it.” (A federal judge.) 
 
• “Let’s not lose sight of the fact that it’s not whether 
the law clerk provides the first draft (in intermediate 
court), or whatever—there are a lot more eyes and 
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minds looking at the cases than used to be the case; 
this is a large aid in support of the error correction 
function; the staffing arrangements work well to 
serve that end.”  (A state judge.) 
 
There were also different views about how much 
importance to attach to the writing of opinions, particularly in 
cases that do not involve novel legal issues. One perspective was 
expressed by a justice on a state supreme court: 
Most of my work is reading intermediate court decisions 
and deciding what to decide.  The one thing I always read 
is the [IAC] opinion. And, not a huge amount of the time 
but more than I wish, I read something that leads me to say 
to myself, “Judge Smith didn’t read this as closely I have.”  
[The reason is that] something is said [in the opinion] about 
the facts and how the law in the field works—this puts it a 
little too strongly, but [what I see is] a rookie mistake, a 
law clerk mistake, that I would expect the judge to have 
uncovered.  This to a certain extent is due to the difference 
between published and unpublished [opinions]; I assume 
they read the [draft of a published opinion] in a different 
way. But you can see fraying around the edges, maybe in 
ways that don’t alter the outcome, but they probably alter 
the perspective of the lawyers in that case and their clients 
about whether this case did get the appropriate amount of 
judicial time. 
Perhaps other judges would have the same reaction if they 
read opinions as closely, and with as much sensitivity to nuance, 
as this participant does. Yet there is another way of looking at 
the matter. A state intermediate court judge said: 
Some opinions are what a colleague of mine calls a “meat 
and potatoes opinion.” If it’s that kind of opinion in an 
error-correcting court (and intermediate courts are error-
correcting courts), no one thinks it makes a damn bit of 
difference who writes the opinion if it’s grammatically 
correct and legally correct.  What difference could it 
possibly make?  But if it’s a significant case, most judges 
will want to write that opinion, just because of the kind of 
person that becomes an appellate judge. 
In a somewhat similar vein, a federal judge offered these 
reflections: 
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On the whole, the increased use of law clerks or staff 
attorneys has probably not changed the outcomes in many 
cases, although it is hard to know for sure.  But what is 
written on the page—that is, how opinions are worded—is 
definitely different than it would be if judges drafted all 
opinions. By “different,” I do not necessarily mean 
“worse.” The quality of law clerks and staff attorneys is 
very high, and, in some chambers, the clerks probably write 
better opinions than the judge. 
The fact that law clerks and staff attorneys do so much 
drafting does not particularly bother me, because I believe 
that it is the outcome or the holding of a case that is 
important, and not the precise words chosen by the 
authoring judge (or law clerk). But this is lost on some 
attorneys and trial judges, who put far too much weight on 
the precise wording of opinions. 
E. Other Aspects of Delegation 
Apart from the specific issues raised by screening and the 
writing of opinions, have appellate judges, in their efforts to 
keep up with their caseloads, gone too far in delegating 
responsibility to law clerks and staff attorneys? Would they 
necessarily know if they had? We asked the discussion leaders 
to put these questions to the judges in their groups. 
1. Assessing the Extent of Delegation 
Almost every judge emphasized that the amount of 
delegation varies greatly from one judge to another, even within 
the same court. Some indicated that one or more of their 
colleagues might have crossed the line. One state judge said: 
Judges on [my court] vary dramatically in how much they 
delegate to law clerks.  Some almost never read briefs, but 
instead rely entirely on summaries prepared by clerks.  
Others read every word of every brief. As far as drafting 
opinions, most judges ask their law clerks to do initial 
drafts. Some judges will edit those drafts substantially; 
others will not. In a few extreme cases, judges delegate too 
much to their clerks, and the clerks perform core judicial 
functions. 
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A judge from another state said: 
Delegation does vary a lot from judge to judge, but no 
judge could survive without doing some delegating. And 
you need to pay attention to the people to whom judges are 
delegating. In [our state], incoming law clerks are [not paid 
enough] to consistently attract the best law school 
graduates, especially when student loan debt often exceeds 
$100,000. Most of the clerks are pretty good, but some 
aren’t, and delegating to them can cause real trouble. 
Another state judge said point blank that there is too much 
delegation in his court. As evidence, he commented that if he 
wants to have a serious conversation about a case, it has to be 
with a senior law clerk, not another judge. In a similar vein, a 
member of a state supreme court said he has felt for a long time 
“that there are staff handling motions from prisons who are 
actually making the decisions, which I’m very uncomfortable 
with. I try to look at everything that comes before me, but I’m 
not sure my colleagues do.” 
These expressions were not limited to state judges. A 
federal appellate judge offered this assessment: 
I do feel that there is too much delegation of difficult cases 
to one judge and that judge’s clerks. I also believe that the 
nonargued cases clearly are not given the [kind of scrutiny 
they should get] by judges, although I see that as less a 
problem with those easier cases. Given the volume, it is 
difficult to do serious collegial checking on other judges’ 
work product. 
Other judges expressed confidence that their courts had 
avoided any undue delegation, although some indicated that the 
breaking point might be near. One state judge said simply, “My 
court controls the staff, not the other way around.” Another state 
judge commented: “The ultimate responsibility of any decision 
issued out of my chambers is with me. I look at the [material] 
that’s presented to me and give it further review and 
consideration as necessary.” A federal judge spoke in similar 
terms: “Although we get substantial assistance from staff in 
screening and preparing cases, each judge fully informs himself 
and makes his own best decision on the law and the facts.” But a 
state judge emphasized the cost of avoiding undue delegation: 
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Our court has resisted going down the road of delegating 
responsibility. Just about every facet of the work, including 
screening, stays in the hands of judges. The problem is that 
we end up with backlogs of opinions, and so we’re 
struggling to find ways to remain “hands on” while 
avoiding the problems of delay. We’ve tried mediation but 
sometimes the lawyers don’t want to do it. 
Another state judge went even further, saying: “My 
problem is not delegating too much, but rather that I don’t 
delegate enough. I essentially have no life outside the court.” 
2. Keeping Delegation within Proper Bounds 
How would judges know if they have gone too far in 
delegating elements of the judicial function? Some participants 
said that it is impossible to find objective benchmarks—perhaps 
even to answer the question at all. One judge added (in a 
comment that was echoed in other groups): “Delegation happens 
bit by bit, one step at a time, and each incremental delegation is 
rationalized.  By the time the delegation has become excessive, 
it’s too late.” 
Nevertheless, there were a number of comments that, 
explicitly or implicitly, suggested ways of monitoring delegation 
and keeping it within proper bounds. Some participants pointed 
to possible quantitative measures. One lawyer raised the 
question whether the business school literature on “span of 
control” might be applied to judicial chambers. Management 
literature, the lawyer added, “indicates that eight direct reports is 
at the limit of one person’s span of control.” But probably very 
few appellate judges supervise as many as eight subordinates, 
even including secretaries. A federal judge put the limit much 
lower: “I don’t think any judge can give meaningful supervision 
to more than three law clerks. More than three would spread the 
judge too thin.” 
Other participants, at least implicitly, rejected numeric 
measures. One lawyer noted that, in her practice, she confronts 
the issue of how many associates she can responsibly supervise. 
She said that “one knows when one gets to the point that” 
delegation has gone too far. 
Beyond this, the discussions in the various groups made 
clear that the question “how can a judge know when he or she 
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has gone too far?” cannot be completely separated from the 
question of what constitutes a core judicial function in an 
appellate court. And the latter is as much open to debate as the 
former. Even individual judges may have some ambivalence as 
to where the line should be drawn. For example, one federal 
appellate judge said, “When I first started [on the federal bench], 
I felt that editing the law clerks’ work was cheating.  Now I 
accept that I am an editor.” 
One group’s discussion is particularly interesting. Several 
judges in the group pointed out that “there are lots of internal 
pressures to give judges incentives to take responsibility for 
fully preparing for each case.”  As one federal judge in the 
group put it, each member of his court feels the need to be fully 
prepared in order to avoid “letting your colleagues down.” 
These comments tie in with the state judge’s remark, 
already quoted, to the effect that if he wants to have a serious 
conversation about a case, it has to be with a senior law clerk, 
not another judge. The common thread is that an appellate court 
can go a long way toward controlling delegation by providing 
frequent occasions for the judges to demonstrate to one another 
that they have actually thought through the issues presented by 
the cases and are not simply accepting the conclusions of law 
clerks. Probably that is not difficult to do when cases are orally 
argued, even for ten minutes. But screening-docket cases, at 
least in most courts, would not easily lend themselves to this 
preventative. 
3. Delegation and Transparency 
A recurring theme in the breakout sessions was that when 
lawyers do not know much about the way in which appellate 
judges use their law clerks and staff attorneys, the lawyers often 
assume the worst. Thus, in group after group, the participating 
lawyers repeated the call for greater transparency in the internal 
processes of appellate courts. 
The belief in the value of transparency is not grounded 
solely in concerns about overdelegation. On the contrary, it also 
implicates the issues discussed in Part II about the politicization 
of appellate courts. One lawyer explicitly linked the two themes: 
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What we need is greater transparency in the processing of 
cases which would acknowledge the responsibility given to 
staff. “Just trust us” is not a sufficient argument to support 
judicial independence in the current political climate, and 
appellate courts need to find ways to make their processes 
more visible and understood in order to defeat the popular 
perception that judging is as personal as legislating. 
Transparency can have other benefits as well, as a colloquy 
in one group highlights. A state judge in the group expressed 
skepticism about how helpful it would be to get “attorney input 
about the internal policies of the court.” He continued: 
Most of what [our court] does internally it does as a matter 
of necessity. If attorneys were to say, for example, “we 
don’t like all of this delegation to law clerks,” the court 
could do little more than respond, “We don’t like it either, 
but we don’t have much choice.” 
This prompted a state judge from another state to comment: 
“One thing that might come out of increased transparency is the 
bar pushing the legislature to provide more resources to the 
court so that some objectionable internal practices will no longer 
be necessary.” 
Transparency also has a practical side, as the discussion in 
another group emphasized. As summarized by the Reporter: 
“The lawyers felt that they could deal with any system as long as 
it was transparent and they knew who actually would decide 
how their appeal would be handled.  That knowledge would 
permit them to tailor their arguments to the decisionmaker.” 
What does transparency mean, and how can courts do more 
to promote it? Participants described several measures that they 
viewed as successful or planned to undertake: 
 
• “[Our state] has an active bench-bar committee. It 
provides a forum for frank exchanges between the 
bench and bar about how the courts are functioning. 
It’s been very helpful.” (A state judge.) 
 
• “In [our state], after a meeting at which the bar gave 
negative feedback about the use of summary 
dispositions, judges stopped issuing them. 
Transparency is helpful not only to get input about 
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specific practices but to increase confidence in the 
work of the courts.” (Another state judge.) 
 
• “The decision whether or not to publish is a resource 
issue.  The judges on my court simply cannot write a 
full-blown published opinion in every case. They 
have to pick and choose. The judges spend time on 
the most important cases, and the others are largely 
delegated to staff attorneys. [My state’s] appellate 
courts plan to be more transparent about this process 
and invite attorneys to speak up if they have better 
ideas.” (Another state judge.) 
 
• “The circuit judges [in our circuit] travel around the 
circuit and meet with attorneys to talk about 
procedures.” (A lawyer.) 
 
• “One of the best parts of a conference like this is 
hearing judges tell how things actually get done, 
which provides some reassurance.” (Another 
lawyer.) 
 
Admittedly, these ideas are hardly earth-shaking. But on 
the evidence of the breakout sessions, it is clear that many 
lawyers feel that state and federal appellate courts do not 
sufficiently explain such matters as how they handle their 
caseloads, what responsibilities are allocated to staff, and (in the 
words of the lawyer quoted earlier) why judging is not “as 
personal as legislating.” At the same time, judges may be relying 
on an exaggerated sense of what lawyers know and how much 
courts disclose about their processes. 
I note, too, that not all judges were equally enamored of 
transparency. Perhaps there was a concern that transparency will 
create a sense of entitlement. As one judge said, “If you tell [the 
lawyers] what the process is, the lawyers will want to argue 
about it.” But most of the judges agreed that greater 
transparency would benefit courts as well as lawyers. 
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F. Technology and Appellate Processes 
Not surprisingly, Judge Posner listed “advances in 
information technology” as one of the reasons that appellate 
courts have been able to “accommodate” increases in caseload 
without strain. In describing the reaction of Conference 
participants, it is useful to divide these advances into four 
categories: electronic documentation; video conferencing and 
argument; video-recorded testimony; and other technologies. 
1. Documents in Electronic Form 
“Electronic documentation” is a shorthand for the new 
technologies that allow lawyers to submit their briefs and the 
record in electronic form. In many appellate courts today, the 
medium of preference is the CD-ROM. As one lawyer 
explained, a hyperlinked brief and electronic record on a CD 
permit the reader “to move with a single click from a statement 
of supposed fact set forth in a brief directly to the relevant 
portion of the record.” 
Electronic documentation aroused almost universal 
enthusiasm among the Conference participants; this is one 
development that enhances quality as well as productivity. Two 
interrelated points were discussed in the various groups. 
First, when the record and briefs are submitted via CD, 
judges and their law clerks can readily check assertions or 
quotations in briefs against the record.  This allows the court to 
detect misstatements by the parties; as one participant observed, 
it enables the judges to “keep the attorneys honest.” 
Interestingly, one federal judge expressed the suspicion that 
such misstatements might be on the increase because attorneys 
think judges will be too hard pressed to notice them: 
We’re actually hoping [that hyperlinks] will keep lawyers a 
little more honest about their citations. That’s a problem 
I’ve noticed from volume as well. We’re getting some good 
lawyers who have good reputations, and I tend to think 
sometimes they fudge on the record in rather a cynical view 
that judges are so busy they won’t catch it. 
Second, electronic documentation enhances the accuracy of 
appellate decisionmaking. As summarized by one Reporter, 
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it allows judges to reach a more informed decision by 
having more ready access to the evidence in the case.  
Moreover, with the ability to do term searches through the 
record, rather than sifting through boxes of transcripts and 
other documents, it is easier for judges to catch relevant 
portions of the record that attorneys may have missed. 
Electronic documentation can perform a similar function 
with respect to the precedent-focused aspects of decisionmaking. 
Links to decisions bearing on the legal issues raised on appeal 
can be included in the briefs, so that the judges have immediate 
access to all of the authorities the brief relies on. Taking this one 
step further, a federal judge reported that his judicial assistant 
“can change the citations in his draft opinions into hyperlinks, so 
that the other judges on the panel can easily look up the cases 
cited.” This too saves judges’ time. 
The discussion did point to some downsides of these 
widely supported uses of technology by courts.  To the extent 
that technology makes it much easier for courts to do their own 
independent investigation into the evidence or facts of the case, 
some lawyers are concerned that the judges will “take over their 
cases.”  One lawyer expressed concern that “furnishing a brief in 
electronic form makes it easy for a judge to use large portions of 
the brief in the opinion.” The lawyer found that worrisome. As 
for term-searching in electronic documents, some participants 
commented that it becomes quite easy to miss relevant material 
if you don’t use the right search term.  On the whole, though, the 
participants strongly favored interactive briefs and other forms 
of electronic documentation. 
2. Argument and Conferencing by Video or Telephone 
In contrast to electronic documentation, the use of video 
transmission for oral argument and conferencing generated more 
negative than positive comments. The lawyers in particular 
emphasized the downside. One Reporter summarized the 
reaction of the lawyer participants: “Argument via 
videoconference is awkward in that it can be difficult to have 
visual contact with all the judges.  In addition, the procedure 
denies lawyers the non-verbal cues that they get from the judges 
when the judges and the attorneys are assembled in the same 
location.” 
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Some judges joined in these expressions of dislike, but 
others were more supportive of the practice. Here are some of 
the points that they made: 
 
• In one federal circuit, some senior judges are now 
offering to hear a certain number of appeals if they 
have to travel to the seat of court, but a greater 
number of appeals if they can stay home and 
participate via two-way video. It is hard for the court 
to insist on physical presence in those cases. 
 
• In another circuit, when severe winter storms have 
made travel especially difficult or unsafe, 
videoconferencing (or even teleconferencing) has 
allowed the court of appeals to be able to proceed 
with arguments from remote locations instead of 
postponing argument. 
 
• In one state, the appellate courts use 
videoconferencing quite a bit. The judges and 
lawyers in that state are widely dispersed 
geographically. Videoconferencing saves judges and 
attorneys considerable time and expense. 
 
It is noteworthy that all of these comments rely on special 
circumstances of one sort or another. They do not suggest that 
argument or conferencing via video would be desirable 
otherwise. 
Indeed, throughout the groups, the participants identified 
only a single benefit from holding argument by video: It saves 
money for lawyers and their clients. As one federal judge said, 
“An attorney in [a distant city in the circuit] with a small case 
before the [Court of Appeals] appreciates not having to travel to 
[the seat of court] for oral argument.” In a similar vein, some 
lawyers commented that alternatives to in-person argument can 
be useful “where clients cannot afford to pay for attorneys to 
travel to a distant court.” But observations like these were 
outnumbered by comments emphasizing the value of having 
judges and lawyers physically present in court for oral 
arguments. 
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Telephonic arguments aroused even greater dissatisfaction. 
As one lawyer said, “I cannot imagine presenting an oral 
argument without seeing the judges’ faces.” In one group, the 
lawyers generally agreed that they would rather delay the 
decision of a case than have a telephone argument, unless that is 
all that was available. 
Overall, it seems clear that argument and conferencing by 
video or telephone can not be counted among the technologies 
that have enabled appellate judges to “accommodate” their 
increased caseloads. These forms of technology are not widely 
used; they are widely disliked; and (with the possible exception 
of the comment about senior judges), no one suggested that they 
enhance judges’ productivity.40 
3. Video Recording of Trial Testimony 
Several of the groups discussed a form of technology that is 
not yet in widespread use and may never be: video recording of 
trial proceedings to supplement (or replace) the written 
transcript. Two questions predominated. Would appellate judges 
have the time to watch recordings of witness testimony? And 
would the use of video recordings alter the standard of appellate 
review? 
Most of the participants who spoke to the first question 
expressed doubt that judges would want to take the time 
required to view video recordings of testimony. For example, 
one state judge said, “If you want to really see what [a particular 
witness] had to say, you’ve got to watch it in real time, and 
that’s a very laborious way of going about it.” Another state 
judge agreed, saying that his state had considered adopting the 
practice, but “one of the reasons that ultimately our supreme 
court rejected that as an appropriate medium is because it was so 
tedious for appellate judges, clerks or whoever’s watching it, to 
watch it in real time.” A few participants spoke more positively, 
 
 40. I must admit to some surprise there was not more support for video arguments from 
judges, particularly judges who must otherwise travel to the seat of court for oral argu-
ments. As I have already observed, even with all of the benefits of modern technology, 
travel time is surely less productive for judges than time in chambers. To the extent that 
judges can participate in oral argument from their home city, they are gaining in efficiency. 
The explanation, I suppose, is that judges value the visual contact and the non-verbal cues 
(from their colleagues as well as from counsel) as much as lawyers do. 
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emphasizing that “you don’t have to watch the whole 
proceeding; you can watch on limited issues.” But that was a 
minority view. As one participant said, “Judges can read 
transcripts much faster than they can watch a recording of 
testimony.  A judge may, out of curiosity, occasionally want to 
look at a recording, but, in the vast majority of cases, judges will 
want to stick to transcripts.” 
There was no consensus on whether the use of video 
recordings would alter the standard of appellate review. One 
lawyer expressed the concern that with the ability to view trial 
proceedings, “appellate judges may start substituting their 
judgment about the credibility of witnesses for the judgment of 
trial judges.” Another lawyer foresaw “a new standard of 
review” with the equivalent of “instant replay” in Monday night 
football. A state judge spoke in similar terms of the prospect of 
“de novo review” of factual findings if appellate judges watch 
trial videos. 
That was probably not the majority view, however. Several 
participants emphasized that deference given to factual findings 
by trial judges is not based solely on the trial judge’s ability to 
see the witnesses, but also on other considerations, including 
division of labor, pressures of volume, and tradition. Participants 
in several groups discussed the experience of Kentucky, which 
for some years has used only a videotaped record. A judge from 
another state reported that Kentucky appellate judges have said, 
“Well, I just tell myself that it’s not my job [to evaluate 
credibility], and then I don’t.” In another group, a participant 
said that empirical studies of the Kentucky practice “have found 
no effect on the degree of deference trial court findings of fact 
receive on appeal.” 
4. Other Technologies 
There was very little discussion in the breakout groups of 
the well-established technologies that undoubtedly have enabled 
appellate judges to handle a larger volume of cases than they 
could in 1975 without loss of quality. Primary among these are 
the three mentioned at the outset of this article: electronic legal 
research, word processing, and email. A few participants did 
note the transformation. For example, a state judge said: 
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Before word processing was introduced, judges [on my 
court] had to prepare an original and eight carbon copies of 
an opinion. [Other judges] were loathe to ask for changes, 
simply because changing an opinion was such a logistical 
nightmare. Now there is a lot more input from judges on 
[opinions prepared by their colleagues]. 
Judges from some courts, notably the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, also noted the value of computerized case 
management—for example, in facilitating the efficient handling 
of multiple cases raising similar issues. 
Electronic legal research, word processing, and email have 
been in near-universal use for quite some time. But with the 
exception of electronic documentation, none of the newer 
technologies discussed by the participants seem to offer any real 
prospect of further enhancing judges’ productivity. Does this 
mean that, at least in the technologically advanced courts, the 
ceiling has been reached, and there is no room for additional 
improvement? History tells us that it would be rash to proclaim 
the end of invention. Yet as comments by some participating 
judges implicitly suggest, there is a limit to the number of cases 
that a judge can actually understand and personally decide in a 
given number of hours or days. Beyond that point, technology 
cannot increase productivity. 
V. LOOKING AHEAD 
In one of the breakout groups, as already reported, a state 
supreme court justice confidently told the other participants that 
when a conflict develops between panels of the state’s 
intermediate courts, “the supreme court will take the case.” 
Meanwhile, in another group, a judge from one of those 
intermediate courts was saying, “It is a problem when 
intermediate courts in the state have conflicts that are not 
resolved by our supreme court.” One could hardly find a better 
illustration of how the same reality can look very different to 
different actors in the system. 
Another illustration comes from one of the Reporters. The 
topic was undue delegation: 
Judges tended to “circle the wagons” on this issue. They 
insisted, without exception, that they are conscious of the 
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need to avoid undue delegations to staff. On the other hand, 
they couldn’t identify any benchmarks that could be used to 
determine whether delegation has become excessive. 
Nevertheless, they were convinced that none of them had 
reached, or were even close to reaching, the point of undue 
delegation to staff. 
The reaction of the attorneys was very different. There was 
a pervasive sense among the lawyers that many appeals 
aren’t getting the time and attention they deserve from the 
judges. Not surprisingly, as outsiders, lawyers weren’t able, 
for the most part, to say whether it was excessive 
delegation to staff that caused the problems they see with 
appellate decisionmaking. They tended to look at external 
indicia of those sorts of problems. 
But perceptions are not necessarily fixed. Recall the 
comment by a lawyer in another group: “One of the best parts of 
a conference like this is hearing judges tell how things actually 
get done, which provides some reassurance.” 
As Arthur England notes in his Introduction, one of the 
goals of the Conference organizers was to encourage 
“continuing discussions among those immersed in and most 
affected by the appellate justice systems.”41 In my view, that 
continuing discussion can be most effective if focused on 
particular states or courts. The Florida Bar has already taken the 
lead by sponsoring an “Appellate Justice Conference” focused 
on the state’s District Courts of Appeal.42 Earlier (and 
independent of the National Conference), the University of 
Arizona College of Law sponsored a symposium about the 
Ninth Circuit.43 
Discussions at the 2005 National Conference suggest that a 
promising subject for such an examination is the Eleventh 
Circuit. Participants in at least six of the breakout groups voiced 
concerns about that court; these concerns centered on the size of 
the court’s legal staff, the extensive use of visiting judges, and 
 
 41. England, supra n. 2, at 69. 
 42. A full account of the conference should be available soon at the web site of the Ap-
pellate Practice Section of The Florida Bar, http://www.flabarappellate.org/. 
 43. See Arthur D. Hellman, Toni M. Massaro & Stephen L. Wasby, Ninth Circuit Con-
ference: Introduction, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 221 (2006). 
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the “screening box” approach to routine cases.44 But at one of 
the plenary sessions, a judge of the court strongly defended the 
court’s practices. Moreover, it is clear that with respect to one of 
the concerns—visiting judges—the perceptions have 
outdistanced the reality.45 A conference might provide 
“reassurance,” or it might alarm lawyers even more. But I have 
no doubt that a “candid assessment of the realities and directions 
of . . . appellate justice”46 in the Eleventh Circuit would benefit 
the court as well as its constituents. It might also produce 
insights that would be helpful to other courts whose practices 
have generated concerns among lawyers and judges. 
The participants in the 2005 National Conference on 
Appellate Justice shared a great deal of information with one 
another. This included perceptions as well as facts—the former 
perhaps as important as the latter. I hope that this Report, by 
making that information available to a wider audience, will 
encourage other organizations to provide additional 
opportunities for judges and lawyers to exchange views and 
experiences with the aim of improving the system of appellate 
justice in the various states and circuits. 
 
 44. I have expressed similar concerns. See Arthur D. Hellman, Assessing Judgeship 
Needs in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Policy Choices and Process Concerns, 5 J. App. 
Prac. & Process 239, 253-60 (2003). 
 45. One participant said that a panel of three active circuit judges “is unheard of”; an-
other said that “about fifty percent of all panels have at least one visiting judge.” Both 
statements are exaggerations (though the second is not far from reality if one considers 
only published opinions). 
 46. England, supra n. 2, at 69. 
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APPENDIX—DISCUSSION LEADERS AND REPORTERS 
 
GROUP 
 
 
DISCUSSION LEADER 
 
REPORTER 
 
1 
 
Charles A. Bird 
 
 
Carol Ann T. Mooney 
 
2 
 
 
Charles E. Carpenter, Jr. 
 
 
William M. Richman 
 
3 
 
 
Mark R. Kravitz 
 
J. Clark Kelso 
 
4 
 
 
James C. Martin 
 
Patrick J. Schiltz 
 
5 
 
 
Eric J. Magnuson 
 
Stephen L. Wasby 
 
6 
 
 
Luther T. Munford 
 
Lauren K. Robel 
 
7 
 
 
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain 
 
Chad M. Oldfather 
 
8 
 
 
Craig T. Enoch 
 
Gerald F. Uelmen 
 
9 
 
 
Sanford Svetcov 
 
William L. Reynolds 
 
10 
 
 
Deanell Reece Tacha 
 
Stephen F. Smith 
 
11 
 
 
John Charles Thomas 
 
Robert H. Klonoff 
 
12 
 
 
Roger D. Townsend 
 
Joan E. Steinman 
 
13 
 
 
Martha C. Warner 
 
Carl W. Tobias 
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